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Beyond Regulation: A Comparative
Look at State-Centric Corporate Social
Responsibility and the Law in China
Virginia HarperHo*

ABSTRACT

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is often understood as
the voluntary actions firms take beyond legal compliance.
However, in recent years, governments around the world have
also begun to actively promote CSR, reflecting broader
governance trends that embrace "soft law," quasi-voluntary
standards, and other novel incentives to move companies
toward and beyond minimum regulatory goals. Comparative
legal scholarship has only recently begun to consider the
intersections of these mechanisms with positive law, formal
institutions, and traditionalregulatory enforcement structures.
The adoption of these policies in historically weak regulatory
environments raises puzzling questions about their motivation,
scope, and potential.
As a leader among emerging markets, China offers an
important context in which to consider state CSR policies and
the role of alternative regulatory tools in legal implementation.
This Article adopts a comparative perspective to examine how
national and subnationalgovernments in China advance CSR.
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Based on primary interview data, it develops a state-centric
model of CSR that contrasts with the market-based model
adopted by U.S. governments and the relational model
advanced by EU member states. The Article concludes by
consideringthe implications of state-centric CSR initiativesfor
norm creation and legal implementation.
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INTRODUCTION

Constrained regulatory capacity and an awareness of the limits
of traditional command and control regulation have led many
governments around the world to look for alternative tools to
incentivize good corporate conduct.' Public recognition of these same
limits has spurred a diverse and dynamic corporate social
responsibility (CSR) movement, which historically has been driven by
consumers, investors, and civil society organizations,2 but in recent
years has also captured the attention of governments, 3 including
some in emerging markets. 4 Indeed, the role of governments in

1.

A deep literature analyzes these trends. See, e.g., ROBERT AGRANOFF &

MICHAEL McGUIRE, COLLABORATIVE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: NEW STRATEGIES FOR
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2003); IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3, 19 (1992); EUGENE
BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY
UNREASONABLENESS (1982); FIONA HAINES, CORPORATE REGULATION: BEYOND 'PUNISH
OR PERSUADE' (1997); JAY A. SIGLER & JOSEPH E. MURPHY, INTERACTIVE CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO REGULATORY COMPULSION (1988); Jody Freeman,

Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997); Peter
J. May, Compliance Motivations: Affirmative and Negative Bases, 38 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
41, 41-42 (2004).
2.
See, e.g., DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND
LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 16 (2005); Doreen McBarnet, Corporate

Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, For Law: The New Corporate
Accountability, in

THE

NEW

CORPORATE

ACCOUNTABILITY:

CORPORATE

SOCIAL

RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 9, 45-54 (Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom
Campbell eds., 2007).
3.
Laura Albareda et al., The Changing Role of Governments in Corporate
Social Responsibility: Drivers and Responses, 17 BUS. ETHICS: EUR. REV. 347, 347
(2008); see also, e.g., JOSEP M. LOZANO, LAURA ALBAREDA & TAMYKO YSA,
GOVERNMENTS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: PUBLIC POLICIES BEYOND
REGULATION AND VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE (2008); Jeremy Moon, Government as a

Driver of Corporate Social Responsibility 1 (ICCSR Res. Paper Series, No. 20-2004,
2004); infra Part II (surveying state-backed CSR initiatives).
4.
See infra Part II.B; see also GTZ & BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, THE CSR
NAVIGATOR: PUBLIC POLICIES IN AFRICA, THE AMERICAS, ASIA AND EUROPE (2007),

available at http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de; Jeremy Moon, Nahee Kang & JeanPascal Gond, Corporate Social Responsibility and Government in Western Europe and
Northeast Asia from a National Governance Systems Perspective, 3-4 (ICCSR Res.
Paper Series, No. 56-2010, 2010). See generally TOM Fox, HALINA WARD & BRUCE
HOWARD, WORLD BANK, PUBLIC SECTOR ROLES IN STRENGTHENING CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: A BASELINE STUDY (2002), available at htxtp://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/

16017IIED.pdf (surveying CSR practices in emerging markets).
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promoting CSR reflects broader governance trends that embrace "soft
law," quasi-voluntary standards, and other novel incentives to move
companies toward and beyond minimum regulatory goals.5
A diverse literature has examined the emergence and impact of
these new tools on firm behavior.6 Related work, much of it within
political science and public administration, has also begun to examine
the role of governments in promoting CSR; some of this literature
explores the connections between state-backed CSR and "new
governance" approaches, where private and quasi-private actors and
institutions supplement or complement the traditional roles of the
state.7 Scholars of international law have also frequently examined
the intersections of alternative governance tools with positive law,
formal institutions, and traditional regulatory enforcement
structures, 8 but few comparative scholars have considered CSR
within that mix. 9 This Article brings these literatures together to
investigate a surprising phenomenon-the recent efforts of
governments in China to advance CSR.
As a leader among emerging markets, China offers an important
context in which to examine state promotion of CSR. Over the past
decade, governments in China at various levels have instituted new
measures to promote CSR as an explicit policy objective. Many are
tied directly to legal compliance or regulatory mandates; others go
"beyond regulation" but make use of existing institutions and
incentive structures.10 These trends place China in the company of

5.
See sources cited supra note 1. The public administration literature on
governance emphasizes relational networks, deregulation, the intersection of public
and private resources, and the use of multiple policy instruments. Carolyn J. Heinrich
et al., Governance as an Organizing Theme for Empirical Research, in THE ART OF
GOVERNANCE: ANALYZING MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 3, 3 (Patricia W.
Ingraham & Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. eds., 2004). On the connection between CSR and
new regulatory trends, see, e.g., LOZANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at 25-26
(reviewing related literature); VOGEL, supra note 2, at 8-10 (addressing new trends);
McBarnet, supra note 2, at 31-44. See also infra Part II.A.
6.
See sources cited supra note 1.
7.
See sources cited supra note 5. On "new governance" and its intersections
with regulation, see generally LAW & NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE E.U. AND THE U.S.
(GrAinne de Buirca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek,
New Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation,
13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539 (2007).
See, e.g., JENNIFER ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL
8.
RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 69-72

(2006) (discussing "soft law" and its role in the development of international law on
CSR); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation
Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 501 (2009) (considering the contributions of new
governance tools as a form of international regulation).
9.
Notable exceptions include ZERK, supra note 8, at 7 (noting that many new
regulatory proposals are "designed to enhance corporate accountability"), and Li-Wen
Lin, Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Window Dressingor Structural Change?,
28 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 64, 64 (2010).
See infra Part III (surveying state-backed CSR in China).
10.
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governments around the world that are actively promoting CSR-in
fact, by some measures, China leads many of its emerging market
peers and even many Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries in the level of government support for
CSR. 11 Yet these developments have only recently attracted the
attention of Western legal scholars.' 2
Given the continued dominance of the state in the Chinese
economy and society, it may come as no surprise that China's
governments are now defining CSR as well. On the other hand, that
governments in China might be emerging as CSR advocates strikes
many observers as a contradiction in terms. Indeed, state policies to
advance CSR in emerging markets like China and other historically
weak regulatory environments raise puzzling questions about their
motivation, scope, and potential: Why, for example, would
governments that are unable or unwilling to effectively enforce labor,
environmental, or consumer-protection laws advance CSR? How do
CSR policies intersect, if at all, with law? And most fundamentally,
how can state-backed CSR move companies toward basic compliance,
not to mention best practices, when positive law has failed? The
answers to these questions are of interest to scholars of comparative
regulatory systems, legal reform, and compliance, but they are also
critical for foreign investors who face competitive challenges from
uneven legal implementation and weak compliance incentives in
these important growth markets.
This Article offers a preliminary response based on an analysis of
the recent efforts of Chinese governments at both the national and
subnational levels to advance CSR. Following methodology used in
prior comparative studies of state-led CSR practice,' 3 the analysis
rests in part on a documentary review of Chinese legislative sources,
official policy documents, and secondary sources referencing
government initiatives that either expressly promote CSR or that
14
indirectly incentivize responsible business practice, broadly defined.

11.
See GTZ & BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, supra note 4, at 9-10 (placing China
above Brazil, India, and Poland and on par with the United States by some measures).
See, e.g., Lin's excellent survey of CSR developments in China. Lin, supra
12.
note 9, at 68. A recent special issue of the University of British Columbia Law Review
on Corporate Social Responsibility in the Asia-Pacific Rim also includes contributions
on CSR developments in China. Pittman B. Potter, CorporateSocial Responsibility in
the Pacific Rim, 45 U.B.C. L. REV. 635, 635-36 (2012). Leading treatments of the topic
by Chinese scholars include ZHENGFU TUIJIN QIYE SHEHUI ZEREN FALU WENTI YANJIU
[GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF CSR AND THE LAW] (Wang Dan ed., 2010) [hereinafter
GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF CSR]; ZHENGFU YU QIYE SHEHUI ZEREN: Guoji JINGYAN
YU ZHONGGUO SHIJI [GOVERNMENTS AND CSR: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES AND
CHINESE PRACTICES] (Chen Jiagui et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter GOVERNMENTS & CSR
2010]. Scholarship on regulatory fields intersecting with CSR, such as environmental,
labor, consumer protection, and philanthropy, is of course too vast to reference here.
See sources cited supra note 3.
13.
This review adopted the broadest possible view of CSR and included
14.
sources referencing "harmonious" (hexie to iW) business practice or sustainability
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The results of this stage of the analysis are summarized in Part IV
and in Table 1 of the Appendix. These findings are supplemented by
over seventy semi-structured interviews conducted in 2011 and 2012
with local and provincial-level officials and representatives of
nongovernment organizations (NGOs), domestic and foreign
businesses, and trade associations in Guangdong and Zhejiang
provinces, as well as in Beijing and Shanghai. Since CSR policies are
constantly evolving, many important examples have no doubt been
overlooked. However, this approach makes possible general
observations about the scope, diversity, and motivations of statebacked CSR initiatives.
Although comparative legal scholarship tends to focus on
national law and legal systems, disaggregating the analysis to the
subnational level here is important for a number of reasons. First, the
Chinese central government has decentralized many core
administrative responsibilities and primary enforcement authority to
subnational governments. 15 Provincial and local resources and
commitment are therefore most critical to legal enforcement and
implementation of national legislation. 16 Second, like most other
national governments worldwide, China has not yet adopted a
national CSR policy. 17 Its central government has also given
subnational governments considerable latitude for policy innovation

(kechixu fazhan _WERR) as well. Primary online sources used to identify many of
the subnational initiatives examined here include CHINA CORP. Soc. RESP.
MONITORING & EVALUATION SYs., http://www.siccsr.org/en/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2013)
(Sino-Dutch
CSR
Project);
SINO-GERMAN
CORP.
Soc.
RESP.
PROJECT,
www.chinacsrproject.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2013); SINO-SWEDISH CSR COOPERATION
NETWORK, http://csr.mofcom.gov.cn (last visited Feb. 6, 2013). All are in partnership
with the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). Other key secondary sources from
which government CSR programs have been identified include CHINA WTO TRIBUNE &
SINO-GERMAN CORPORATE SOC. RESPONSIBLITY PROJECT, ZHONGDE MAOYI KECHIXU
FAzHAN YU QIYE XINGWEI WEI GUIFAN XIANGMU, ZHONGGUO DIFANG ZHENGFU TUIJIN

QIYE SHEHUI ZEREN ZHENGCE FENXI [THE ANALYSIS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS' CSR
POLICIES IN CHINA] (2010) [hereinafter GIZ 2010 REPORT]; ZHONGGUO DIFANG
ZHENGFU TUIJIN QrYE SHEHUI ZEREN ZHENGCE GAILAN [OVERVIEW OF CSR POLICY
DEVELOPMENT BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN CHINA] (Gao Baoyu et al. eds., 2012),
available at http://www.chinacsrproject.org [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF CSR POLICY
DEVELOPMENT]; Joelle Brohier, CSR Frameworks in China and the European Union
Insights for CSR Workshops, CHINA-EUROPA FORUM (June 2010), http://www.chinaeuropa-forum.net/bdfdoc-1704_en.html. Media reports of CSR initiatives, official
reports on CSR implementation, official government websites, and other secondary
sources were also consulted.
15.
See, e.g., Jae Ho Chung, Central-Local Dynamics: Historical Continuities
and Institutional Resilience, in MAO'S INVISIBLE HAND: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 297, 297-313 (Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth J.
Perry eds., 2011) (placing reform-era decentralization in historical context).
16.
See JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 653-92
(2008) (surveying the sources and nature of China's implementation challenges).
17.
GTZ & BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, supra note 4, at 32-33.
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and experimentation based on local conditions. 18 Therefore,
references here to the "state" refer broadly to a range of national-level
state agencies and subnational governments. It is also important to
acknowledge that the Chinese state, like other political systems, is
not monolithic, and the views of individual officials at various levels
of the Chinese government and in different agencies may vary widely
from the perspectives reflected in official policy.
Placing these trends in comparative context, Part II first defines
CSR and challenges common understandings of CSR as strictly
"beyond regulation." It then introduces a widely recognized
framework developed by the World Bank for conceptualizing the role
of governments in promoting CSR and explores the range of tools
governments have adopted to do so, drawing on examples from
Europe, the United States, and several emerging markets. Part III
then applies and extends this analytical framework to introduce the
CSR tools adopted by national and subnational governments in
China.
Based on the interview and documentary data presented in Part
III, Part IV develops a state-centric model of CSR and considers its
implications for norm creation and legal implementation. This Article
does not presume any causal relationship between firms'
commitments to CSR (or legal compliance) and financial performance,
although CSR advocates, including governments in China, rely
heavily on the "business case" for CSR. The author has engaged with
this debate elsewhere. 19 This Article observes first that state
promotion of CSR creates new incentive structures for some firms
that are designed to promote legal compliance. Moreover, in contrast
to other governments that support CSR practices, Chinese
governments are able to define and advance CSR not only directly in
their capacity as legislators, regulators, enforcers, and market
players, but also indirectly through relational and institutional ties to
20
the business community and leading civil society organizations.
This expansive role of the state is in keeping with China's brand
of state capitalism and allows the state to solicit firms' support of its
policy goals under the rubric of CSR. However, the centrality of the
state's role means that the legitimacy and effectiveness of these
initiatives depends on the continued commitment, resources, and
influence of governments at various levels. In short, this Article
argues that the success of state-centric CSR, like legal

See generally Sebastian Heilmann, Policy Experimentation in China's
18.
Economic Rise, 43 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV. 1 (2008).
See Virginia Harper Ho, "Enlightened Shareholder Value": Corporate
19.
Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 82-86
(2010) (surveying empirical evidence of the links between CSR and corporate financial
performance and between stakeholder-oriented investment strategies and superior
returns on investment).
See infra Part IV.
20.
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implementation
itself, depends
ultimately
on government
responsibility.
State-centric CSR. is therefore unlikely to overcome existing
governance gaps that impede the implementation of law. However, it
represents an adaptation of the institutions and accountability
structures that shape law's legitimacy, enforcement, and even
substance. This Article maps the intersections between state-backed
CSR initiatives and the law and lays a foundation for future
empirical work on their impacts.

II. CSR AND THE STATE REGULATION AND "BEYOND REGULATION"
CSR is a concept that is susceptible of myriad meanings. 21
However, common definitions converge on two basic dimensions: (1)
how the company conducts its business, in other words, "good
corporate citizenship," and (2) the company's responsiveness to
stakeholders, such as employees, local communities, and the
environment. 22 Under the first dimension, CSR encompasses efforts
by the company to adhere to moral and ethical norms and to make a
positive impact on society. The second dimension emphasizes that a
company is not only accountable to its shareholders for the financial
success of the firm, but that it also has an obligation to a wider range

21.
See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the
Regions: A Renewed EU Strategy for 2011-14 for CorporateSocial Responsibility, 3.1,
COM (2011) 681 final (Oct. 25, 2011) [hereinafter EC 2011 CSR Strategy], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/corporate-socialresponsibility/indexen.htm (defining CSR as "the responsibility of enterprises for
their impacts on society"); Fox, WARD & HOWARD, supra note 4, at 1 (defining CSR as
"[tihe commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic development,
working with employees, their families, the local community and society at large to
improve their quality of life" (alteration in original)); see also ZERK, supra note 8, at 2932 (surveying definitions of CSR).
22.
Similar definitions have been recognized by Chinese scholars as well. See,
e.g., GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF CSR, supra note 12, at 28-30 (discussing its
stakeholder foundations); Liu Cheng, Gongsi Shehui Zerende Dingwei [Defining
Corporate Social Responsibility], 18 ZHONGWAI FAXUE [PEKING U. L.J.] 530-40
(discussing various dimensions of the concept of CSR in Chinese scholarship).
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of constituencies.2 3 This dimension is often linked to the corporation's
contribution to economic and environmental sustainability. 24
At first blush, the proposition that governments can play a role
in promoting CSR may seem self-contradictory. CSR is typically
understood as voluntary actions companies take beyond what is
required by law.25 This common conception implies that CSR operates
exclusively "beyond regulation" and at the initiative of private, rather
than public, actors. It draws support from the fact that pressure
toward CSR in the developed world has typically come from market
players-namely, consumers and investors-and from civil society
organizations. 26 From this perspective, a government's role in CSR is
carried out through its core legislative and enforcement function, and
indeed, most aspects of CSR, such as labor rights and environmental
protection, are already the subject of independent legal obligations in
most jurisdictions.2 7
However, most commentators now acknowledge that CSR cannot
be defined simplistically in terms of distinctions between voluntary
tools or "soft law," on the one hand, and "hard" enforceable legal
mandates on the other, 28 nor is the assumed divide between the two a

23.
See Cheng, supra note 22 (identifying these dimensions within Chinese
scholarship); see also EC 2011 CSR Strategy, supra note 21,
1.1 ("CSR requires
engagement with internal and external stakeholders. . . ."); GOVERNMENT PROMOTION
OF CSR, supra note 12, at 28-30 (noting that CSR could be analyzed in the framework
of Chinese economics law base on social interest); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-05-744, NUMEROUS FEDERAL ACTIVITIES COMPLEMENT U.S. BUSINESS'S GLOBAL
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY EFFORTS 5 (2005) [hereinafter GAO REPORT],

available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05744.pdf (discussing different definitions
and components of CSR).
24.
See, e.g., EC 2011 CSR Strategy, supra note 21, 1 1.2 ("CSR underpins the
[European] strategy for smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth . . . ."); INT'L ORG. FOR
STANDARDIZATION

[ISO],

DISCOVERING

ISO

26000,

(2012),

available

at

http://www.iso.org/iso/discovering_
iso_26000.pdf (emphasizing that the various
components of an organization's CSR commitment under the IS026000:2010 CSR
standard are designed to collectively increase its contribution to sustainability).
25.
See, e.g., EC 2011 CSR Strategy, supra note 21, T 1 (stating that CSR
concerns actions by companies over and above their legal obligations towards society
and the environment"); Commission Green Paperon Promotinga European Framework
for Corporate Social Responsibility, 20, COM (2001) 366 final (July 7, 2001)
[hereinafter EC 2001 CSR Green Paper] (defining CSR as "a concept whereby
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations
and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis").
26.
See generally DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND
LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2005) (discussing the origins and

potential of CSR).
27.
The "core subjects and issues" included in the IS026000:2010 CSR
standard illustrate this clearly; they include organizational governance, human rights,
labor practices, the environment, fair operating practices, consumer issues, and
community involvement and development. ISO, supra note 24, at 7.
28.
See Zerk, supra note 8, at 69-72 (addressing the distinction between "soft
law" and "hard law" in an international context).
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clear one. 29 Indeed, legal compliance is widely recognized as a
foundational element of CSR. 3 0 For example, ISO26000:2010, an
international CSR standard developed through the combined effort of
ninety-nine member countries of the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), defines CSR to include legal compliance and
"respect for the rule of law." 3 ' Similarly, in the well-known pyramid
model of CSR developed by Archie Carroll, law forms the pyramid's
base, while corporate philanthropy, ethical and moral dimensions,
and the internalization of CSR strategy into firm operations lie at the
peak of the pyramid and evidence a more extensive commitment to
CSR. 32
Moreover, both legal obligations and CSR commitments that go
beyond regulation can be enforced using a range of tools that span the
supposed divide between voluntary and mandatory rules. 33 For
example, firms' voluntary CSR commitments are in fact enforced by
global NGOs, consumer activism, and other alternative governance
mechanisms; they can influence the content of future regulation as
well. 34 At the same time, regulation, policymaking, standard setting,
and other forms of governmental facilitation of CSR can influence
firms' voluntary adoption of responsible business practices beyond
enhanced compliance with legal rules. as The assumed boundary
between CSR and the law blurs further when governments become
involved in setting CSR policies and integrate those policies into their
traditional legislative and regulatory functions, as described below.
CSR and the law are therefore intertwined and mutually
influencing. 36

See id. at 30 (challenging the voluntary-mandatory distinction as
29.
"confusing and unhelpful"). See generally Doreen McBarnet, Corporate Social
Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, For Law: The New CorporateAccountability,
in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE LAW (Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Campbell eds., 2007).
See EC 2011 CSR Strategy, supra note 21, 1 3.1 ("Respect for applicable
30.
legislation, and for collective agreements between social partners, is a prerequisite for
[CSR]."); EC 2001 CSR Green Paper, supra note 25, 1 21 ("Being socially responsible
means not only fulfilling legal expectations but also going beyond compliance . . . .").
See ISO, supra note 24, at 3 ("[C]ompliance with law is a fundamental duty
31.
of any organization and an essential part of their social responsibility."); see also INT'L
ORG. STANDARDIZATION, www.iso.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2013) (listing ISO members).
Archie B. Carroll, The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Towards
32.
the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders, BUS. HORIZONS, July-Aug.
1991, at 40-43.
ZERK, supra note 8, at 35. On these intersections, see generally CHRISTINE
33.
PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION AND DEMOCRACY
(2002); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, TransnationalRegulatory Networks and Their Limits,
34 YALE J. INT'L L. 113 (2009).
See ZERK, supra note 8, at 32-36 (discussing how voluntary standards can
34.
ultimately shape legal rules).
For empirical evidence, see, e.g., Christine Parker's work on "meta35.
regulation," that is, the regulation of self-regulation. PARKER, supra note 33, at 245-91.
ZERK, supra note 8, at 35.
36.
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A. Government Roles in Advancing CSR As the European Commission has recently affirmed, positive law
and related regulations serve as a foundation on which voluntary
CSR initiatives may build. 3 7 However, law is only one of many
sources of norms that ground economic and social interactions, and
its limits are well recognized.3 8 From the legislative process to the
optimal calibration of legal incentives to enforcement of enacted laws
and regulations-all of these dimensions present challenges. 3 9 The
rise of modern global economic systems, multinational enterprises,
and the technological capacity for the rapid exchange of information,
capital, and even culture has made these limits more obvious. 40
As a matter of domestic regulation, then, governments around
the world have experimented with a range of regulatory tools to
address these limits, moving beyond traditional command-andcontrol, penalty-based regulation toward a mix of strategies that
includes reliance on cooperative tools that emphasize voluntary and
quasi-voluntary strategies, rather than the threat of penalties, to
influence corporate and individual behavior. 4 1 These tools include
penalty waivers for self-disclosure of violations, educational
programs, and financial incentives for firms who implement
voluntary internal compliance systems. 42 Many of the CSR policy
tools introduced here replicate or reinforce these cooperative- or
compliance-oriented enforcement strategies.

37.
See, e.g., text accompanying supra note 35.
38.
See PETER SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE 419-55 (2000) (discussing the contributions of law, norms, and markets);
CHRISTOPHER STONE, WHERE THE LAw ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE
BEHAVIOR (1975) (surveying alternatives to law as a source of norms).
39.
See Christine Parker, The "Compliance" Trap: The Moral Message in
Responsive Regulatory Enforcement, 40 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 591, 591-92 (2006)
(explaining the regulatory dilemma of deterrence-based and compliance-based
incentives); see also sources cited supra note 1.
40.
See ZERK, supra note 8, at 243-83 (discussing the emergence of
transnational voluntary regimes in response to the limits of territorially based
regulatory tools). See generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening
International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the
Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501 (2009) (same); Einer Elhauge,
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 803-04
(2005) (noting the limits of law as a constraint on corporate conduct, in part because
"variations in legal regulation among different nations ... inevitably leave legal gaps
requiring supplementation by social and moral sanctions that operate internationally");
Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic
Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705 (2002) (challenging standard economic
arguments that conducting business "within the bounds of the law" provides a clear
standard for modern multinationals).
41.
See sources cited supra note 1; see also EC 2011 CSR Strategy, supra note
21,
4.3 ("Self and co-regulation are acknowledged by the EU as a part of the better
regulation agenda.").
42.
See SIGLER & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 143-65 (surveying these tools).
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To be sure, many factors beyond regulatory goals motivate
governments to promote CSR. These include attracting investment
and improving private-sector competitiveness, integrating local and
global markets, and solving complex social and environmental
problems
through public-private
partnerships. 43 However,
governments also support CSR in an effort to minimize the negative
externalities of corporate activity, create a level playing field for
business, bolster the legitimacy of law and state policy, and fill
governance gaps created by the state's own institutional weakness. 44
They seek to achieve these goals by harnessing voluntary firm
practice as a complement to state regulation.
The World Bank and the United Nations have identified key
public-sector roles in CSR to include "mandating, facilitating,
partnering and endorsing" CSR. 45 Of these four roles, only the
"mandating" role contemplates a traditional role for the government
as legislator or regulator. These roles are not mutually exclusive, and
some tools span multiple roles.
Endorsing. By endorsing CSR, governments raise awareness and
lead by example. Governments' tools to endorse CSR include
information dissemination, training, and educational programs;
governments also endorse CSR as market actors by building CSR into
public procurement and other contracting requirements. 4 6
Facilitating.Governments facilitate firm CSR practices through
standard setting, voluntary guideline and certification systems,
auditing and monitoring, and establishing financial and reputational
incentives for firms. They can also facilitate CSR by enacting
enabling regulation to support civil society organizations and by
implementing multilateral conventions and guidelines. Targeted CSR
trainings, government-coordinated or government-subsidized services
to aid companies in CSR reporting, and other forms of capacity
building also facilitate CSR practices. 47
Partnering. This dimension includes direct government
collaboration with companies on specific projects (public-private
partnerships), state participation in efforts of international
organizations to promote CSR, and state-mediated dialogue around
CSR involving companies and other stakeholders. 48 In many cases,

UN GLOBAL COMPACT & BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, THE ROLE OF
43.
GOVERNMENTS IN PROMOTING CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND PRIVATE SECTOR
at
available
(2010),
10-11
DEVELOPMENT
IN
ENGAGEMENT

http://www.unglobalcompact.org/does/news-events/8.1/UNGCBertelsmannn.pdf.
Id. See generally Jeremy Moon, Government as a Driver of CorporateSocial
44.
Responsibility (ICCSR Res. Paper Series, No. 20-2004, 2004) (surveying the UK
experience).
FOx, WARD, & HOWARD, supra note 4, at iii; UN GLOBAL COMPACT &
45.
BERTELSMANN STIFrUNG, supra note 43, at 16-18.
46.
Fox, WARD, & HOWARD, supra note 4, at 6-8.

47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 5.
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the relationship between governments and businesses is a
bidirectional one, where both contribute to evolving practices and
policies. 49 Governments may also directly engage civil society
organizations and business in designing, implementing, and
monitoring CSR programs, for example, through joint working groups
on CSR policy. 50 Accordingly, partnerships around CSR issues can
become a-three-way collaboration between governments, the business
community, and civil society organizations, in which governments
serve as initiators, moderators, or facilitators.5 1
Mandating. Finally, governments can mandate CSR adoption
through legislation and regulatory enforcement. Strategies in this
category include mandatory sustainability reporting and standards
for the content of corporate codes of conduct that may reach beyond
legal compliance. 52 As the European Commission has recognized,
traditional top-down regulation can itself play an important
complementary role in "creating an environment more conducive to
enterprises voluntarily meeting their social responsibility."53
Examples of particular policies in each of these areas are listed
in Table 1 of the Appendix. Table 1 orders the tools as shown above,
moving from soft tools (e.g., endorsing or facilitating) to hard tools
(e.g., mandating). As Table 1 details, government backing for CSR
most obviously includes state initiatives that are explicitly designated
as advancing CSR. However, it also includes state-backed voluntary
compliance programs, like the European Union's Eco-Management
and Audit Scheme (EMAS), discussed below, which are intended to
move companies beyond compliance as part of regulatory enforcement
strategies.
B. CSR and the State in Comparative Perspective: The
United States, Europe, and Emerging Markets
Over the past decade, a number of studies have surveyed the
diverse roles played by governments in the United States, the

49.
See LOZANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at 37 (describing relational
CSR approaches); Fox, WARD, & HOWARD, supra note 4 (discussing the respective roles
of business and government).
50.
LoZANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at 35-39; Fox, WARD, & HOWARD,
supra note 4, at 22.
51.
See Albareda et al., supra note 3, at 350, 352 ("[O]ne of the emerging
themes regarding the role of government in the development of CSR is centered on its
role as mediator, facilitator and partner."); see also LOzANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra
note 3, at 36-37 (discussing allocation of responsibility in CSR collaboration); UN
GLOBAL COMPACT & BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, supra note 43, at 16 (same).
52.
See generally Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of
Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389 (2005) (advocating such
measures).
53.
EC 2011 CSR Strategy, supra note 21, 1 (noting that "certain regulatory
measures create an environment" that is more conducive to voluntary CSR practices).
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European Union, and many emerging markets in advancing CSR. 54
This literature confirms that governments' approaches to CSR are
informed by each country's political, economic, and cultural context,
as well as by existing relationships between business, government,
and civil society. 55 Not surprisingly, the "themes" or focus areas
encompassed by CSR cover a wide policy landscape-including
corporate governance, philanthropy, social standards (labor and
employment), environmental standards, socially responsible
investment, human rights, consumer protection, and finance, among
otherS5 6-and political and institutional factors influence which areas
governments prioritize. 57 Drawing from this literature, this subpart
surveys the extent of state participation in the CSR space by
governments around the globe and provides a comparative context for
Part III's discussion of the role of governments in China in advancing
CSR.
1.

The Market-Driven Model: The United States

Prior studies have observed that there is far less public demand
for, or even acceptance of, CSR as a public policy in the United States
as compared to Europe. 58 Accordingly, CSR is understood more
commonly as reaching beyond compliance with law, and governments
generally promote CSR only indirectly, beyond traditional regulatory
spheres.5 9 Firms' CSR practices are driven almost entirely by robust
civil society organizations and by firms themselves, often in response

See sources cited supra note 3.
54.
55.
See GTZ & BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, supra note 4, at 4; LOZANO, ALBAREDA
& YSA, supra note 3, at 4-5 (and sources cited therein); Albareda et al., supra note 3, at
350; FOX, WARD, & HOWARD, supra note 4, at iv.
EC 2011 CSR Strategy, supra note 21, T 3.3; FOX, WARD, & HOWARD, supra
56.
note 4, at iii.
See generally LOZANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3 (creating a typology
57.
of CSR policies based on these factors).
See Susan Ariel Aaronson & James Reeves, Nat'1 Policy Ass'n, The
58.
European Response to Public Demands for Global Corporate Responsibility 50-51 (Feb.
5, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://centreonphilanthropy.com/
fileslkbarticles/125112195 8European%2Response%20to%20CSR.pdf.
See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 24; Susan Ariel Aaronson,
59.
Corporate Responsibility in the Global Village: The British Role Model and the

American Laggard, 108 Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 309, 318-29 (2003) (addressing the
differences between American and British approaches to CSR). A 2005 survey by the
federal Government Accountability Office (GAO) using the World Bank framework
noted the lack of any broad federal CSR mandate and found wide variation among
federal agencies on the question of whether active endorsement of CSR was even
appropriate within their mission and scope of authority. GAO REPORT, supra note 23,
at 17-18. Some local governments are equally sensitive. See Changing the Plans,
EcONOMIST, July 14, 2012, at 29 (quoting the director of the Houston, Texas,
sustainability office who emphasized that the city was "not mandating that
[businesses] have to do this [i.e. adopt CSRI")
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to market pressures from investors and consumers and increased
demands from NGOs.6 0
Nonetheless, the federal and some state governments in the
United States have developed various cooperative enforcement tools
that facilitate voluntary compliance with regulatory mandates. 61 The
more prominent examples include the over forty voluntary programs
introduced under the EPA's Reinventing Environmental Regulation
initiative in the 1990s and similar federal and state cooperative
compliance programs relating to occupational health and safety. 62
Like the United Kingdom and other countries in Europe, 63 many
governments in the United States also seek to lead by example when
they act as market players, as evidenced by green-government
procurement standards, which have been adopted by California,
Massachusetts, and other U.S. states. 64 The United States also has a
strong culture of public-private collaboration, elements of which
support corporate legal compliance and broader social responsibility
commitments. 65 At present, twenty-five states and many major cities
have sustainable development programs, some of which engage the
private sector.66

60.

See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate

Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1444-47 (2006) (arguing on this basis that

market forces are sufficient to drive CSR practice). But see VOGEL, supra note 2, at 3-4
(pointing to the limits of market drivers).
61.
See generally Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Government Clubs: Theory
and Evidence from Voluntary Environmental Programs, in VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS: A
CLUB THEORY PERSPECTIVE 231, 231-58 (Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakesh eds.,

2009) [hereinafter VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS] (discussing governmental initiatives in
voluntary environmental programs); Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakesh, The
Regulation Dilemma: Cooperationand Conflict in Environmental Governance, 64 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 152 (2004) (same).

62.

Neil Gunningham, Environmental Regulation and Non-State Law, in

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND LAW: STATE REGULATION AND NON-STATE LAW 109,

118 (Hanneke van Schooten & Jonathan Verschuuren eds., 2008). Some of the more
prominent compliance programs, including the EPA's Performance Track program,
have been terminated. National Environmental Performance Track, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/ (last updated Jan. 12, 2011). For a list of current
programs, see PartnershipPrograms Home, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/partners/ (last
updated Aug. 2, 2011). See also OSHA's Cooperative Programs,U.S. DEPARTMENT LAB.,
http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/compliance-assistance/index-programs.html
(last visited
Jan. 18, 2013) (detailing federal compliance programs administered by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration).
63.
See generally Susan Ariel Aaronson & James Reeves, Nat'l Policy Ass'n,
The European Response to Public Demands for Global Corporate Responsibility (Feb.
5, 2002) (unpublished manuscript).
64.
McBarnet, supra note 2, at 42-43.
65.
See generally Ellen Rogers & Edward P. Weber, Thinking Harder About
Outcomes for Collaborative Governance Arrangements, 40 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 546
(2010) (presenting case studies of successful public-private collaborations around
environmental issues).
66.
See State by State, CTR. SUSTAINABILITY, www.centerforsustainability.org/
resources.php?root=91&category=94 (last visited Mar. 21, 2013) (mapping these
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In addition to the voluntary compliance programs described
above, several federal agencies, including the Department of
Commerce, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy,
also endorse or facilitate CSR through explicit CSR award and
training programs; the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) imposes CSR criteria as a condition of participation in its
programs. 67 Other EPA and Department of Energy programs involve
partnerships with business around sustainability goals. 68 However,
at the federal level, few agencies have adopted specific CSR
programs; those that do have devoted relatively limited resources
toward their support, and some face skepticism about their impact
and efficiency. 69
For the most part, government incentives for firms to consider
their stakeholder impacts are primarily tied to enforcement of legal
mandates, such as incentives for labor and environmental
compliance.7 0 In addition, many federal and state laws, including the
federal income-tax deduction for charitable contributions, state
constituency statutes, and the creation of new stakeholder-focused
business forms in some states, facilitate private-sector CSR efforts. 7 '
Disclosure obligations under federal securities regulation also
promote CSR by requiring greater transparency from some firms with
regard to stakeholder impacts; 72 examples include risk disclosures,
recent guidance from the Securities and Exchange Commission on
climate change-related disclosures, and forthcoming rules under the

initiatives). For an example of a city program, see Changing the Plans, supra note 59,
at 29 (discussing Houston's sustainability programs).
See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 23 (discussing the EPA's Climate
67.
Leaders Program, which partners with businesses to encourage voluntary monitoring
of greenhouse gas emissions); OPIC Policies, OPIC, http://www.opic.gov/doing-businessus/OPIC-policies (last visited Feb. 6, 2013).
GAO Report, supra note 23, at 23 (surveying these programs).
68.
Id. at 19-21; see also Coglianese & Nash, supra note 61, at 231-58
69.
(reporting some of these criticisms).
See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 17-18, 24 (noting also that many
70.
federal agencies, such as the Department of Labor, whose core regulatory mission
relates to CSR, are hesitant to advocate CSR specifically).
See, e.g., Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 63 (Del. 1991) (interpreting DEL.
71.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2011), which authorizes corporate charitable contributions).
On for-benefit corporations and related enterprise forms, see Anne Field, Benefit
Corporations, L3Cs and All the Rest: Making Sense of Those Confusing Choices,
FORBES (May 25, 2012, 9:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2012/05/25/
benefit-corporations-13cs-and-all-the-rest-making-sense-of-those-confusing-choices/.
Sustainability or CSR reports as such are not mandatory in the United
72.
States, but federal securities law generally requires corporate disclosure of all material
information that might impact an investor's decision to purchase the company's stock.
See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). On the limits of
nonfinancial reporting under federal law, see generally Cynthia A. Williams, The
Securities and Exchange Commission and CorporateSocial Transparency, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 1197, 1289-93, 1299-1311 (1999).
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2010 Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act for the extractive
industries.73
In sum, within a typology of government approaches to CSR,74
the role of governments in the United States can therefore best be
understood as a market-based model. In a market-based approach,
governments may adopt incentives that motivate companies to reach
and exceed legal requirements as part of their regulatory mission;
they may also partner with business or civil society. However, much
of the impetus toward responsible business practice depends on firms'
self-regulation; their engagement with customers, investors, and
other stakeholders; and their voluntary participation in third-party
standard setting and monitoring.
2.

The Relational Model: The European Union

As in the United States, there is generally little public support
within Europe for state CSR mandates; therefore, European
governments generally emphasize voluntary CSR commitments.7 5 As
the European Commission's Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for
Corporate Social Responsibility explains:
The development of CSR should be led by enterprises themselves.
Public authorities should play a supporting role through a smart mix of
voluntary policy measures and, where necessary, complementary
regulation, for example to promote transparency, create market
incentives for responsible business conduct, and ensure corporate
76
accountability.

In contrast to the United States, European firms are part of a
business culture that is more comfortable engaging with government
around social welfare issues, and many European member states
boast a record of international leadership around sustainability
issues.7 7 Regional, provincial, and local governments in Europe have

73.
See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334 (Dec. 23, 2009) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249 & 274) (mandating enhanced riskmanagement disclosure); Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to
Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211,
231, 241); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 78(a), (m), 124 Stat. 1376, 1502-04 (2010) (requiring rulemaking on conflict
minerals, mine safety, and extractive industry government payments transparency).
On Dodd-Frank's expansion of the role of federal securities laws in these policy spaces,
see generally David M. Lynn, The Dodd-FrankAct's Specialized CorporateDisclosure:
Using the Securities Laws To Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 327
(2011).
74.
This typology is presented more fully in Part IV. See infra Figure 2.
75.
See GTZ & BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, supra note 4, at 4; ZERK, supra note 8,
at 160-94; Aaronson & Reeves, supra note 59, at 2-5.
76.
EC 2011 CSR Strategy, supra note 21, 1 3.4.
77.
See Albareda et al., supra note 3, at 350 (noting that European firms are
more willing to work with their governments to promote CSR than businesses in the
United States).
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also taken the lead in developing CSR policies and initiatives, often in
advance of central governments. 7 8
The diverse approaches of individual member states to CSR are
framed by common perspectives reflected in a series of fundamental
texts on CSR adopted by the European Union since 2001 that conform
to international standards, by codes such as the OECD Guidelines for
79
Multinational Enterprises, and by international labor standards. In
addition to endorsing key CSR standards and promoting CSR
leaders,8 0 the European Commission sees CSR as a space in which
governments play a facilitative role and in which policies must be
developed through dialogue between the business community and
other social actors. 8 1 For example, a key element of EU policy toward
CSR was the creation in 2006 of a business-led European Alliance for
CSR,82 composed of 180 firms tasked with developing CSR tools to
address, among other issues, supply-chain management and firm
engagement with investors around nonfinancial performance. 83
Governments in some member states, such as the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Sweden, have established institutions to form and
implement CSR policy, either independently or in conjunction with
industry and civil society actors. 84
The European Union also facilitates compliance-oriented CSR;
for example, it sponsors the EMAS, which offers financial and
reputational rewards to participating organizations of member
states.8 5 Many EU member states have also developed disclosure
See EC 2011 CSR Strategy, supra note 21, 1 4.7 (encouraging regional and
78.
local governments to adopt policies in support of CSR); see also LOZANO, ALBRAREDA &
YSA, supra note 3, at 79-80, 151 (detailing subnational initiatives in Denmark and
Italy, respectively).
These include EC 2011 CSR Strategy, supra note 21; Communication from
79.
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic
and Social Committee Implementing the Partnershipfor Growth and Jobs: Making
Europe a Pole of Excellence on Corporate Social Responsibility, COM (2006) 136 final
(Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter EC 2006 CSR Communication]; Communication from the
Commission Concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A Business Contribution to
Sustainable Development, at 3, COM (2002) 347 final (July 2, 2002); EC 2001 CSR
Green Paper,supra note 25.
1 (urging member states to
See EC 2011 CSR Strategy, supra note 22,
80.
facilitate CSR disclosures, dissemination of best practices, award programs, CSR-based
public procurement, and stakeholder engagement).
See LOZANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at 59, 179. In fact, CSR policy
81.
in the European Union has itself been developed collaboratively through a series of
public debates and intergovernmental negotiations. See EC 2011 CSR Strategy, supra
4.1; EUROPEAN MULTISTAKEHOLDER FORUM ON CSR, FINAL RESULTS &
note 21,
RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2004), available at http://circa.europa.eu.
See EC 2006 CSR Communication, supra note 79, at 2-3.
82.
See EC 2011 CSR Strategy, supra note 21, at 5.
83.
LOZANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at 86-87, 101-03, 128-29.
84.
See, e.g., What Is EMAS?, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eulenvironment/
85.
emas/indexen.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2013); see also ZERK, supra note 8, at 39 n.136
(noting that EMAS-compliant firms in the United Kingdom receive a lower risk rating,
which affects the fees firms must pay to the regulatory authority).
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incentives, nonbinding codes of conduct for various industries, and
other self-regulatory schemes that urge firms to go beyond
compliance.8 6
Comparative scholars have depicted state support for CSR in the
European Union in terms of a relational model that emphasizes
cooperation and joint responsibility between public- and privatesector actors.8 7 It contemplates that governments, business, and civil
society will contribute to agenda setting, provide resources, share
responsibility for the success of particular projects, and jointly
establish monitoring and dispute-resolution networks. 88 The
relational approach therefore represents a form of "new governance,"
that is, a regulatory pluralism that reallocates responsibility and
regulatory power from traditional state bureaucracies to networks of
private actors, such as NGOs, self-regulating organizations,
voluntary stakeholder associations, and indeed firms themselves.8 9 In
this model, governments adopt a soft regulatory agenda, acting as
participants, organizers, and facilitators, and preferring positive
incentives over regulatory penalties.9 0 As Figure 1 illustrates, this
relational approach creates four potential relationships: the
government-business dimension, the government-society dimension,
the business-society dimension, and the interrelationship among the
three. 9 '

86.
The United Kingdom is one example. See ZERK, supra note 8, at 38-39
(describing incentives associated with each). Some of these systems deter shirking by
allowing for direct regulatory oversight in the event of breach. Id.
87.
See, e.g., LOZANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at 35-36 (applying the
regional model to analyze CSR public policies); Albareda et al., supra note 3, at 351
(assessing CSR public policies in Italy, Norway, and the United Kingdom).
88.
See LOzANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at 36 (describing the relational
governance model); Albareda et al., supra note 3, at 351 (same); Gunningham, supra
note 62, at 117-18 (describing the role of NGOs in "participatory governance" as a form
of civil regulation); see also Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, Collaborative Governance in
Theory and Practice, 18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 542, 544-45 (2007) (defining
similar approaches as part of "collaborative governance").
89.
Gunningham, supra note 62, at 115.
90.
Albareda et al., supra note 3, at 350, 352.
91.
See LozANo, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at 36-38.
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Figure 1: A Relational Model of CSR

Source: Adapted from LOZANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at 36-37.

The relational approach is strongest in the United Kingdom, and
in the northern European countries of Denmark, Finland, the
Netherlands, and Sweden, where the state has historically played a
central role in social welfare. 92 Prior studies find that these
governments often work cooperatively with firms to develop and
implement shared policy objectives.93 National governments actively
use tax policy and other incentives to motivate CSR adoption by
companies, and local governments are intensely involved in
94
coordinating and facilitating CSR initiatives.
The United Kingdom is widely recognized as a global CSR leader
for its governments' engaged and participatory approach to CSR.9 Its

Lozano et al. characterize these nations as following the "Partnership
92.
Model." See LOZANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at 43.
Id. at 42.
93.
See Aaronson & Reeves, supra note 58, at 16 (noting that Australia and the
94.
United States provide tax credits to promote CSR).
See GTZ & BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, supra note 4, at 32-33. The "Business
95.
in the Community model" refers to the approach adopted by Ireland and the United
Kingdom, where government has facilitated or mediated CSR efforts in support of the
private sector and encouraged a vision of shared responsibility between the
government and the business community. LOZANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at
93-113. It is characterized by "soft intervention policies to encourage company
challenges affecting the community" through
involvement in governance
entrepreneurship and sustainable economic development. Id. at 42.
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comprehensive approach to CSR was first developed in order to enlist
firms in dealing with public policy crises. 96 Formed through an
extended process of public engagement, it emphasizes soft
implementation tools. 97 CSR is facilitated by a separate government
department headed by designated ministry-level officials (the UK
Department for Business Innovation and Skills).98
In Germany, France, and elsewhere in continental Europe, state
partnerships with business and civil society are less extensive. 9 9
However, firms there also have a strong tradition of corporate
citizenship and engagement with labor, local communities, and other
stakeholder groups.' 0 0 In this context, governments have emphasized
sustainable development and encouraged businesses to actively
create social capital and assume responsibility for social and
economic development.10 1 In the Mediterranean countries of Greece,
Italy, Portugal, and Spain, national CSR strategies are at an earlier
stage relative to the rest of the European Union.1 02 Governments
there have served primarily as a facilitator of dialogue among
business organizations, trade unions, academic institutions, and
other stakeholders to develop public consensus on CSR. 0 3

96.
See Albareda et al., supra note 3, at 358 (discussing CSR as part of welfare
state policies); see also EC 2011 CSR Strategy, supra note 21, 1 1.2 (describing the
importance of CSR in "[h]elping to mitigate the social effects of the ... economic
crisis").
97.
On the legislative process behind the United Kingdom's CSR programs, see
Gordon L. Clark & Eric R.W. Knight, Implications of the U.K Companies Act 2006 for
InstitutionalInvestors and the Market for CorporateSocial Responsibility, 11 U. PA. J.
Bus. L. 259, 259-63 (2009); Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging
Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493, 499-523 (2005).
See DEPARTMENT Bus. INNOVATION & SKILLS, http://www.bis.gov.uk/ (last
98.
visited Feb. 7, 2013) (describing the role of the Department for Business Innovation
and Skills). This department is the successor entity to the Department for Business,
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform.
See GTZ & BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, supra note 4, at 18-21.
99.
See Aaronson & Reeves, supra note 58, at 2-5. Lozano et al. identify a
100.
"Sustainability and Citizenship model," which includes Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, and Luxembourg. They further subdivide this model into (1) the Citizenship
submodel, which emphasizes labor issues and sustainable development; and (2) the
Regulatory submodel, adopted by France, which emphasizes mandatory tools and state
CSR leadership. LOZANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at 42-44.
101.
France in particular has adopted a more strongly regulatory approach
toward sustainability, with less emphasis on collaborative policymaking. See LOZANO,
ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at 119-26 (analyzing the French government's
approach to CSR). In contrast to the United Kingdom, for example, France has
introduced mandatory social and environmental disclosures for listed companies. Id. at
125.
102.
LOZANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at 44.
103.
In Lozano et al.'s typology, these countries are categorized as the "Agora
model." Id.
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Emerging Markets and the Developing World

Although much of the research on CSR implementation has
focused on developed economies, governments in many developing
countries and emerging markets, including South Africa, Thailand,
Indonesia, the Philippines, India, Brazil, Egypt, Chile, South Korea,
Nigeria, and Vietnam, have established public policies on CSR.104
Regional organizations, including the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, are also endorsing and promoting CSR policies and
coordination among their member states. 0 5 Many have endorsed
international CSR standards, such as IS026000:2010.106 They have
also promoted firms' CSR practices by facilitating or mandating social
reporting, incorporating CSR concepts into corporate governance
standards, and partnering with industry and civil society
organizations to build firms' capacity.107
Some scholars explain this phenomenon as part of broader
political shifts toward "new governance," perhaps along European
lines, 108 but few studies to date have engaged in any in-depth
examination of state-backed CSR outside the developed world. Given
the aspirations of many countries in emerging markets and across the
Global South to follow in China's footsteps, there is a clear need for a
deeper understanding of why and how governments in China are
advancing CSR. These questions are the focus of Part III.
III. STATE SPONSORSHIP OF CSR IN CHINA

At the 2011 annual plenary meeting of the National People's
Congress (China's top legislative body), Chairman Wu Bangguo
announced that China had succeeded in establishing "[a] socialist
system of laws with Chinese characteristics . . . 'on schedule"' as of

104.
See generally GTZ & BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, supra note 4, at 4 (surveying
CSR practice in emerging markets); Fox, WARD, & HOWARD, supra note 4, at 1-2
(same); Wayne Visser, CorporateSocial Responsibility in Developing Countries, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 473, 473-94 (Andrew
Crane et al. eds., 2008) (conducting a meta-analysis of prior studies of firm CSR
practices in emerging markets).
105.
See, e.g., ASEAN Promotes CSR, AsS'N SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (Sept.
19, 2011), http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/asean-promotes-csr
(reporting on an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional CSR
workshop with participants from member states and the ASEAN CSR Network).
106.
See ISO, supra note 24 (providing guidance on social responsibility).
107.
See generally UN GLOBAL COMPACT & BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, supra note
43, at 8-11 (surveying these developments); Fox, WARD, & HOWARD, supra note 4, at
1-2 (same).
108.
See, e.g., Visser, supra note 104, at 483-84 (reviewing the literature on CSR
as a substitute for governance gaps).
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the end of 2010.109 Yet that same year, China made international
headlines with scandals that underscored the mismatch between the
vast body of legislation it has developed over the past thirty years and
its inability to effectively implement and enforce legal rules through
the institutions it has created.110 This context makes the growing
commitment of Chinese governments to promote CSR particularly
curious.
As a starting point to consider this puzzle, the following
discussion surveys the role of national and subnational governments
in China in advancing CSR. These developments are with few
exceptions quite recent-most date back only to 2006. They should
also be understood in the context of the deep changes in Chinese
society that have occurred over the past decades as the state has
transitioned out of the planned economy. Most obvious among these is
the proliferation of civil society organizations within China in recent
years, many filling needs for social services once provided exclusively
by the state."1 Some organizations directly support firm adoption of
CSR practices, for example, by partnering with firms on charitable
projects, conducting CSR-related research, or offering training on
sustainability reporting or environmental and labor compliance.112
Private philanthropy by individuals and firms has also risen
substantially in recent years,' 1 3 and recent survey results suggest
that a growing number of domestic Chinese firms are embracing CSR
practices as part of corporate strategy.114 Many do so independent of

109.
Socialist System of Laws with Chinese Characteristics Enriches World's
Legislative Framework, XINHUA (Mar. 10, 2011, 10:03 AM), www.npc.gov.cn.
In 2010, strikes at Honda plants in Guangzhou and worker suicides at
110.
Foxconn, Apple, Inc.'s Chinese supplier, highlighted the labor rights crisis and made
headlines in the international press. See, e.g., Frederik Balfour & Tim Culpan, The
Man Who Makes Your iPhone, BUS. WK., Sept. 9, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/
magazine/content/10_38/b4195058423479.htm (discussing the suicides at Foxconn);
Keith Bradsher & David Barboza, Strike in China Highlights Gap in Workers' Pay,
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2010, at Al (discussing a Chinese strike at a Honda factory). A
year earlier, Chinese courts had imposed death sentences on executives at Sanlu, one
of China's leading state-owned enterprises, who were found guilty of lacing infant
formula with the industrial chemical melamine. See Chinese Milk Scam Duo Face
Death, BBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2009, 12:02 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hil7843972.stm.
111.
See Karla W. Simon, The Regulation of Civil Society Organizations in
China: Current Environment and Recent Developments, 9 INT'L J. CIV. Soc'Y L. 55, 58
n.87 (2011) (noting that 243,000 social organizations were registered in China at the
end of 2010).
112.
Examples can readily be found through a range of online sources. See, e.g.,
SYNTAO-SUSTAINABILITY SOLUTIONS, www.syntao.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
113.
See generally 2011 ZHONGGUO GONGYI FAZHAN BAOGAO [BLUE BOOK OF
REPORT ON CHINA'S CIVIC PHILANTHROPY
CIVIC PHILANTHROPY: ANNUAL
DEVELOPMENT] 35-56 (Zhu Jiangang ed., 2012) (presenting summary statistics and
analysis on the growth and funding sources of philanthropic organizations and
charitable funds).
114.
See CONFERENCE BD., BUSINESS & SUSTAINABILITY IN CHINA (2011).
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any direct state influence.115 Therefore, state-backed CSR initiatives
are not emerging in a vacuum; however, the developments introduced
here offer a window into the role of the state in this dynamic policy
space.
A. HistoricalAntecedents
CSR (qiye shehui zeren
R EA*-) is a Western borrowing in
the Chinese language. as well as in its policy,11 6 and ideological and
cultural precedents can best be found with the benefit of hindsight.117
However, the basic notion that business enterprises contribute to the
public welfare has deep roots-before the state-sector reforms of the
1990s, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were not only the lynchpin of
the economy but also the state's conduit for meeting public-welfare
needs (qiye ban shehui Akf)4±)."8 Although Chinese proponents
of CSR today are eager to distinguish it from outmoded notions of the
role of business in society, no this legacy nonetheless remains a
powerful one.
Early references to CSR in the media and in the academy had
already emerged in China by the mid-1980s. 120 However, CSR
concepts were introduced to Chinese companies primarily through
codes of conduct and third-party audits in the wake of the sweatshop
expos6s of the 1990s.121 The reaction of the Chinese leadership to
CSR concepts prior to 2006 was decidedly negative. Many saw CSR as
a tool wielded by foreign consumers, NGOs, and trading partners to
pressure Chinese businesses; CSR was also closely associated with
labor and employment issues, which were particularly contested

115.
This was confirmed
anecdotally in numerous interviews with
representatives of firms in Hangzhou, Guangzhou, and Shanghai. For many of these
firms, the CSR commitments of individual executives are critical.
116.
Other scholars concur. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 9, at 64-67. Unless
otherwise noted, references to policy here and throughout refer solely to mainland
Chinese policy.
117.
See Geoffrey K.H. See, Harmonious Society and Chinese CSR: Is There
Really a Link?, 89 J. Bus. ETHICS 1, 3 (2009) (noting potential Confucian and socialist
roots for the ethical dimensions of CSR).
118.
On the history of CSR in China, see GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF CSR,
supra note 12, at 8-12, 84-88; QIYE SHEHUI ZEREN LILUN YU SHIXIAN [THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF CSR] 48-59 (Chen Ying ed., 2009).
119.
See, e.g., GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF CSR, supra note 12, at 119.
120.
See ZHONGGUO QIYE LIANHEHUI/ZHONGGUO QIYEJIA XIEHUI [CHINA ENTER.
CONFEDERATIONICHINA ENTER. DIRECTORS ASS'N],
2007 ZHONGGUO QIYE SHEHUI
ZEREN FAZHAN BAOGAO [2007 DEVELOPMENT REPORT ON CSR IN CHINA] 18 (Zhang
Yanning et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter 2007 DEVELOPMENT REPORT ON CSR IN CHINA).
121.
See Lu Tang & Hongmei Li, Corporate Social Responsibility
Communicationof Chinese and Global Corporationsin China, 35 PUB. REL. REV. 199212, 200-01 (2009).
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during the 1990S. 122 In response, state agencies and some
subnational governments began to develop homegrown labor
standards and codes of conduct. For example, in 2004, the local
government in Changzhou, a major exporting hub in Jiangsu
Province, developed its own voluntary labor standard, CSA8000, as
an alternative to the international labor standard SA8000, and in
2005, the China National Textile and Apparel Council (CNTAC)
developed its own social standard, CSC9000T, for the domestic textile
industry. 123 CSR concepts became a regular focus of conferences and
policy roundtables, many involving provincial and local government
124
leaders.
National policy toward CSR began to shift in the mid-2000s. In
2005, President Hu Jintao articulated China's new policy vision of
building a "harmonious society," which was adopted as a policy
mandate by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in
2006.125 This policy directive included a mandate for all governments
to "strengthen CSR," 126 paving the way for governments at the
central and subnational level to move into this policy space. 127
Beginning in 2006, President Hu Jintao and other leaders within the
Party and the National People's Congress began to emphasize that
businesses operating in China must not place profit seeking above
morality and the broader social welfare, but rather should adopt
responsible and sustainable business practices.128

122.
See Anita Chan, China Says No to Developed Countries' Corporate Social
Responsibility, 12 INT'L UNION RTS. 18-19 (2005); Li Yin, Xinde Maoyi Bihong?
[SA8000, a New Trade Barrier?], NANFANG DUSHI BAO [S. METROPOLIS DAILY], Nov.
20, 2003.
123.
GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF CSR, supra note 12, at 113-15; THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF CSR, supra note 118, at 61.
124.
See also ZHONGGUO QIYE SHEHUI ZEREN JIANSHE LANPISHU [THE
FOUNDING OF CHINESE CSR: 2010 BLUE BOOK] 444-76 (Li Youhuan et al. eds., 2011)
(presenting a chronology of CSR developments in China); Org. for Econ. Co-operation &
Dev. [OECD], China-OECD Project on Government Approaches to Encouraging
Responsible Business Conduct, at 5-6, OECD Doc. DAF/INV/WD(2007)17 (Dec. 5,
2007).
125.
See China Publishes Its Resolution on Building a Harmonious Society, ST.
COUNCIL INFO. OFF. CHINA (Nov. 15, 2006), http://www.scio.gov.cnizgxwybd/
en/2006/22/200612/tl03742.htm.
126.
Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Goujian Shehuizhuyi Hexie Shehui Ruogan
Zhongda Wentide Jueding [CCP Central Committee Decision on Important Issues
Concerning the Establishment of a Harmonious Socialist Society], 6th Party Plenum of
the 16th CCP Central Committee, art. 5(4) (Oct. 11 2006), available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-10/18/content_5218639.htm.
127.
See See, supra note 117, at 2 (describing the CCP's new policy initiative);
see also Lin, supra note 9, at 90-93 (describing social and environmental problems as
the "internal pull" towards CSR).
128.
GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF CSR, supra note 12, at 156-58; see also, e.g.,
Wen Jiabao Tan Qiyejia Zeren: Chengxin he Daode Shi Xiandai Shehui Yinggai
Jiejuede Jipo Wenti [Wen Jiabao on Entrepreneur's Responsibilities: Integrity and
Morality Are the Urgent Problems for a Modern Society To Solve], PEOPLE'S DAILY
ONLINE (Feb. 27, 2010, 4:54 PM), http://politics.people.com.cn/ GB/11041111.html.
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This policy focus on "harmonious" and "scientific" development
motivated the enactment of new labor and environmental legislation
and the incorporation of CSR into the 2006 revision to China's
Company Law.129 Although its meaning is much debated,13 0 Article 5
of the Company Law now provides that mainland Chinese companies
shall "comply with the laws and administrative regulations, social
morality and business morality" and "bear social responsibilities." 131
The Sichuan earthquake of 2008 and the global financial crisis
gave China's leadership new cause to call for greater social
responsibility from business. 132 While attending the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders' meeting that year, President
Hu Jintao stated: "The government of every nation must strengthen
leadership and oversight, and by establishing and perfecting the law,
create a positive environment for companies to bear social
responsibilities." 1as In 2009, Premier Wen Jiabao echoed this
sentiment in speeches on the financial crisis,134 and officials at the
central and subnational levels began to publicly advocate the
economic development benefits of CSR.13 5 With the clear backing of
China's central leadership, many new national and subnational CSR
programs got their start in 2008 and 2009.136
On the legislative history of Article 5 of the Company Law, see Lin, supra
129.
note 9, at 68-72.
130. For clear statements of the two primary interpretations, see, e.g., Lou

Jianbo, Zhongguo Gongsifa diwu Tiao Diyikuande Wenyi Jieshi ji qi Shishi Lujing [A
Literal Interpretationof Article 5, Clause 1 of China's CorporateLaw, and Its Approach
of Application], in STUDIES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 224, 224-42 (Lou
Jianbo et al. eds., 2009) (interpreting Article 5 as potentially enforceable); Shi Jichun

et al., Lun Gongsi Shehuizeren: Falu Yiwu, Daode Zeren ji Qita [On CSR: Legal,
Ethical, and Other Duties], 2 SHOUDU SHIFAN DAXUE XUEBAO [PEKING NORMAL U. J.]
(2008) (interpreting Article 5 as aspirational and unenforceable).
Gongsifa [Company Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
131.
People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective July 1, 1994, amended Jan. 1, 2006), translated
at http://www.lawinfochina.com (subscription only).
See, e.g., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CSR, supra note 118, at 1 (citing both of
132.
these events).
Hu Jintao Zai APEC Di Shiliuci Lingdaoren Feizhengshi Huiyishangde
133.
Jianghua [Hu Jintao Speech at the APEC 16th Informal Leaders Meeting] (Nov. 22,
2008), transcriptavailable at www.gov.cn/ldhd/2008-11/23/content 1156875.htm.
See Wen Jiabao Zongli Zai Yingguo Jianqiao Daxue Fabiao Yanjiang: Yong
134.
Fazhande Yanguang Kan Zhongguo [Wen Jiabao, Premier, Speech at Cambridge
University: Seeing China from a Development Perspective] (Feb. 2, 2009), transcript
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2009-02/03/content 10755604.htm
at
available
(highlighting the role of morality and social responsibility in solving the financial
crisis).
See ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUEYUAN JINGJIXUEBU QIYE SHEHUI ZEREN
135.
YANJIU ZHONGXIN [CHINESE ACAD. OF Soc. Sci. CSR RESEARCH CTR. [CASS]], 2010
NIAN ZHONGGUO QIYE SHEHUI ZEREN FAZHAN BAOGAO [2010 CSR DEVELOPMENT
REPORT] 2-3 (2010) [hereinafter CASS 2010].
136.
Firms were not necessarily receptive to CSR during this period, however, as
many were struggling to recover from the effects of the financial crisis. Interview with
Daniel Taras, Head of Section, Emerging Econs. (Portfolio Transformation), GIZ, in
Beijing, China (June 30, 2011).
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As in the United Kingdom and other European nations,13 7 then,
the impetus for CSR in China at the central government level has
come from the recognition of the role of business in exacerbating and
perhaps resolving complex public policy challenges. China's Twelfth
Five-Year Plan for 2011-2015 138 reemphasizes that widening
economic disparities, environmental degradation, and consumer
protection remain top priorities for China's leadership because of the
challenge they represent to social stability and ultimately to the
legitimacy of the state 139-all are areas in which business has
influence. Central government support for CSR continues to fuel
active academic and policy debates surrounding CSR concepts and
has encouraged Chinese governments at various levels to take a more
active role in defining and advancing CSR.

B. National CSR Initiatives
Since 2006, numerous initiatives around CSR at the national
level have been introduced in China, but no single State Council
ministry has yet asserted leadership over CSR as a broad policy
domain. Instead, as in much of Europe, 140 numerous agenciesincluding the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the State Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), the Ministry
of Environmental Protection (MEP), and the People's Bank of China
(PBOC)-are actively promoting CSR in some form within their
respective areas of expertise.141 For example, MOFCOM focuses on
CSR programs for export-oriented and foreign-invested enterprises as
part of its promotion of international trade and investment, while the
MEP focuses on incentivizing environmental compliance. The
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology is developing CSR

137.
On the European Union, see Aaronson & Reeves, supra note 58, at 2-5. On
the United Kingdom, see Moon, supra note 3, at 1-2.
138.
A full English translation of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan is available from
Delegation of the European Union to China, EUR. EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE,
http://eeas.europa.euldelegations/china/index en.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
139.
China's citizens have proven willing to use formal administrative legal
channels created by the state, such as administrative, tort, and labor litigation
processes, in increasing numbers, and grass-roots protests are growing in size and
frequency. See, e.g., Michael Forsythe, China's Spending on Internal Police Force in
2010 Outstrips Defense Budget, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2011, 1:27 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201 1-03-0 6 /china-s-spending-on-internal-police-forcein-2010-outstrips-defense-budget.html (reporting 180,000 mass incidents in 2010).
140.
See Albareda et al., supra note 3, at 354 (6bserving CSR initiatives in Italy,
Norway, and the United Kingdom to be housed in different ministries with parallel but
generally uncoordinated agendas); see also LOZANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at
174 (citing examples from Ireland, among others, of government departments dealing
with CSR from their own particular perspective).
141.
For a survey of central-level agencies promoting CSR, see OVERVIEW OF
CSR POLICY DEVELOPMENT, supranote 14, at 12.
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policies that would apply to small- and medium-sized enterprises. 142
All of these measures are described below and in Table 1 of the
Appendix.143

Table 1 adapts the typologies developed by the World Bank to
categorize government roles around common approaches; it also
includes principal-agent controls as an additional category beyond
the World Bank framework to account for the direct managerial and
administrative tools available to the state in promoting CSR among
state enterprises. 144 The national and subnational initiatives outlined
below are shown as a spectrum of soft to hard tools, as suggested by
the World Bank typology. While Table 1 isolates particular CSR tools
and instruments, some governments or agencies have adopted
multiple strategies as part of a multilayered CSR policy, while others
are active at only one level. The following discussion and Table 1 do
not include basic legislation on labor, environmental, or other CSRrelated issues, although most Chinese analyses of CSR do so.
1.

Endorsing

As observed above, the central government has already endorsed
CSR through direct policy statements and sustainability goals.
Several central-level ministries have also endorsed CSR by rewarding
top CSR performers and raising awareness of CSR issues. These
include the Ministry of Civil Affairs, which has initiated a China
Charity Awards program, and MOFCOM, which disseminates
information on CSR programs by governments and by business, in
partnership with the Swedish, Dutch, and German governments.1 45
The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) has taken the lead in
compiling data on CSR practices and publishes a list of CSR
leaders.146
Like many of its trading partners, China has also directly
CSR initiatives developed by intergovernmental
endorsed
organizations, including the UN Global Compact, the UN Principles
for Responsible Investment (PRI), and the International Finance

Interview with Gao Baoyu, Senior Technical Advisor, GIZ, in Beijing, China
142.
(June 30, 2012).
See infra Table 1. For the methodology by which these and other examples
143.
were compiled, see supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. As noted earlier,
national agencies continue to innovate in the area of CSR, so the measures noted in
this Part are current through December 2012.
144.
The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) has adopted a similar
and
typology of state roles: regulator (guizhizhe n$1J]), promoter (tuijinzhe *t),
). See GOVERNMENTS & CSR 2010, supra note 12, at 1.
monitor (jianduzhe iQ#
145.
On the MOFCOM programs, see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., CASS 2010, supra note 135; CASS, 2011 ZHONGGUO QIYE SHEHUI
146.
ZEREN YANJIu BAOGAO [2011 CSR BLUE BOOK OF CORPORATE SociAL RESPONSIBILITY]
28 (Chen Jiagui et al. eds., 2011) (identifying twenty-four of the top one hundred
Chinese enterprises as CSR leaders).
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Corporation's Equator Principles, which apply to global banking
institutions engaged in project finance.1 47 For example, China has
had a Global Compact liaison office since 2004 that has operated
primarily under the auspices of the China Enterprise Confederation
(CEC), an industry association with strong state ties; many leading
SOEs, financial institutions, and private firms are Global Compact or
PRI signatories. 148 Most recently, China participated in the
development of the IS026000:2010 standards, and the stock
exchanges are promoting the adoption of the Global Reporting
Initiative's (GRI's) reporting standards by domestic firms. 149 A
number of state agencies have also been involved in high-level
intergovernmental exchanges focused on sustainability and CSR,
including, for example, a collaboration between the OECD and
MOFCOM, which was launched in 2006.150
2.

Facilitating

State agency facilitation of CSR at the national level is carried
out in large part through research initiatives, capacity building, and
the adoption of voluntary CSR guidelines. With regard to the former,
MOFCOM and CASS have each established research centers focused
specifically on CSR issues; MOFCOM has also undertaken CSR
trainings and central-level conferences to build firm capacity and
support subnational governments in promoting CSR. 151 Quasivoluntary measures that apply to all enterprises include the "green
finance" measures adopted by the China Banking Regulatory
Commission (CBRC) and the MEP in 2007, which condition public
listing, preferential loans, insurance, and tax refunds on compliance
with environmental standards.1 52

147.
The UN Global Compact is a framework of ten principles derived from
international law that signatory firms and organizations can voluntarily adopt. See
UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Feb. 7,
2013). The UNPRI is a similar framework for institutional investors. See PRINCIPLES
RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, www.unpri.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2013). On the Equator
Principles, see EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, www.equator-principles.com (last visited Jan. 21,
2013).
148.
For signatories, see Local Networks: China, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL
COMPAcT, http//www.unglobalcompact.org/NetworksAmoundTheWorld/local network sheet/CN.html
(last visited Feb. 7, 2013); PRINCIPLES RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, supra note 147.

149.
Interview with Consultant, Global Reporting Initiative [GRI], in Beijing,
China (June 18, 2011) (reporting in addition that the Shanghai Stock Exchange is
recommending CSR reports be based on the GRI).
150.
See GOVERNMENTS & CSR 2010, supra note 12, at 11 (citing SASAC's role);
OECD, supra note 124, at 7.
151.
See generally GIZ, www.giz.de/china (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (detailing
MOFCOM's CSR programs).
152.
See Guojia Huanjing Baohu Zongju, Zhongguo Yinhang Hangye Jiandu
Guanli Weiyuanhui & Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang [Envtl. Prot. Agency, Chinese Bank
Regulatory Comm'n & People's Bank of China [PBOCI], Guanyu Luoshi Huanbao
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China's stock exchanges in Shenzhen and Shanghai, which
operate under the regulatory oversight of the China Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC),s 53 have also facilitated CSR more
directly by establishing CSR indices and encouraging CSR reporting
for listed companies.154 Unfortunately, the reporting requirements do
not require independent auditing, nor do they require that all
material information be disclosed. Accordingly, researchers uniformly
observe wide variation in the quality of CSR and sustainability
reporting in China, with even leading public companies only rarely
reporting any negative information.155
In 2008 and again in 2010, the State Council made several
efforts to craft broad national CSR guidelines that would apply to
both state and nonstate enterprises, but these efforts have not yet
borne fruit. 156 However, CASS has developed CSR reporting

Zhengce Fagui FangfanXindai Fengxian de Yijian [Opinion on Implementing Law and
Policy for Environmental Protection To Guard Against Credit Risk], July 12, 2007;
PBOC, Guanyu Gaijin he Jiaqiang Jieneng Huanbao Lingyu Jinrong Fuwu Gongzuo
de Zhidao Yijian [Guidelines on Improving and Enhancing Financial Service for
Energy Conservation and Environmental Protection], PBOC Pub. No. 215, June 29,
2007, available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-07/06/content_675200.htm (listing four
major measures); Zhongguo Yinjianhui Guanyu Yinfa Luse Xindai Zhiyin de Tongzhi
[Notice Regarding Green Credit Guidelines], No. 4, Feb. 20, 2012.
153.
See Zhengjuan P.R.C. [Securities Law], arts. 178-179 (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) (charging
the CSRC with "carry[ing] out supervision and administration of the securities
market"); see also Benjamin R. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions
in China's Securities Market, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 935-41 (2008) (describing the
history and status of the stock exchanges in relation to the CSRC).
154.
See Shanghai Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo, Guanyu Jiaqiang Shangshi Gongsi
Shehui Zeren Chengdan Gongzuo Ji Fabu "Shanghai Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo Shangshi
Gongsi Huanjing Xinxi Pilu Zhiyin" de Tongzhi [Shanghai Stock Exchange Notice on
Strengthening Listed Companies' Assumption of Social Responsibility and on Issuing
the Guidelines on Listed Companies' Environmental Information Disclosure], May 14,
2008 [hereinafter SSE CSR Notice]; Shenzhen Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo, Shenzhen
Zhengliaoyisuo Shangshi Gongsi Shehui Zeren Zhiyin [Shenzhen Stock Exchange
Social Responsibility Instructions to Listed Companies], Sept. 25, 2006 [hereinafter
SEZ Guidelines], available at http://www.szse.cn/mainlen/rulseandregulations/sserules/
2007060410636.shtml. For exchange indices, see infra the Appendix.
155.
Some CSR reports are prepared with the aid of international NGOs, while
others are drafted by advertising agencies and firms' public-relations departments.
According to one analysis by CASS of over three hundred large publicly traded
companies in China's A-share market, 68 percent of Shanghai-listed companies and 84
percent of Shenzhen-listed companies issued nonfinancial reports; however, 99 percent
failed the CASS content assessment. See Shekeyuan Baogao: 99% Shangshi Gongsi
Shehui Zeren bu Jige [CASS Report: 99% of Listed Companies' CSR Substandard],
JINGJI GuANcHA WANG
[ECON. OBSERVER]
(Dec. 29,
2011, 8:27 AM),
http://www.eeo.com.cn/2011/1229/218914.shtml (quoting a 2011 CASS study).
156.
The State Council initially considered a unified CSR Guideline for SOEs,
private enterprises, and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), but this was abandoned
with guidelines only being adopted for SOEs in 2008. Interview with Governmental
Affairs Liaison, Am. Chamber of Commerce, in Shanghai, China (June 7, 2011).
MOFCOM attempted in 2008 to draft national guidelines for FIEs, but the project was
abandoned in the wake of the financial crisis. Id. The All-China Federation of Industry
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guidelines,' 5 7 and national industry and trade associations, which
retain close ties to the state-including CNTAC, the CEC, the China
Industrial Association, the China Social Work Association, the
Chinese Association of Small and Medium Enterprises, and the China
International Contractors Association, among others-have created
CSR reporting guidelines for their members to facilitate CSR learning
and best practices.' 5 8
3.

Partnering

Although NGOs and other civil society organizations have
become important globally and locally as drivers of CSR and as
partners with business in designing, implementing, and monitoring
CSR programs, state agencies have primarily engaged with
international NGOs and other international institutions in the
development and implementation of CSR. Early cooperative projects
began with the United Kingdom's Department of International
Development in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 2007, the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Department of MOFCOM established
three CSR initiatives in cooperation with the German, Swedish, and
Dutch governments, respectively, to promote CSR at the national and
subnational levels. 159 Although each has a different focus,
collectively, they represent central-level partnerships to provide CSR
training and consulting, develop CSR indicators, and share best
practices. 160 The objectives of the Sino-German partnership, in
particular, are to "develo[p] and implement[t] CSR policies, strategies
and guidelines via public private partnerships, industry associations
and other intermediaries."' 6 1 As noted above, government officials
also engage with international efforts to facilitate multistakeholder
dialogue and raise awareness of CSR issues.162

and Commerce began a draft for private enterprises in 2010, but with little support
from the business community. Id.
157.
CASSCSR, www.cass-csr.org/index.php?option=comcontent&module=28&
sortid=32 (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). These were based largely on the internationally.
adopted GRI standards. Interview with Daniel Taras, supra note 136.
158.
E.g., ZHONGGUO DuIwAI CHENGBAO GONGCHENG SHANGHUI [CHINA INT'L
CONTRACTORS ASS'N], ZHONGGUO DuIwAI CHENGBAO GONGCHENG HANGYE SHEHUI
ZEREN ZHIYIN [CSR GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTORS] (2010);
ZHONGGUO GONGYE XIEHUI [CHINA INDUS. ASSN], ZHONGGUO GONGYE QIYE JI GONGYE
XIEHUI SHEHUI ZEREN ZHINAN [CHINA INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES AND INDUSTRIAL
ASSOCIATION CSR GUIDELINES] (2008), available at www.csr-china.net; see also
GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF CSR, supranote 12, at 172-74 (describing these efforts).
159.
See OECD, supra note 124, at 45 (discussing the UK collaboration). On the
MOFCOM collaborations, see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
160.
See, e.g., GIZ 2010 REPORT, supra note 14.
161.
See id.
162.
See OECD, supra note 124, at 5-6 (describing the 2007 China-OECD
responsible business project).
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Beyond intergovernmental collaboration, engagement between
the state and the business community around CSR has largely been
undertaken through state-affiliated civil society organizations and
trade associations. At the national level, these include the China
Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO), the Chinese Enterprise
Confederation/China Enterprise Directors' Association (CEC/CEDA),
the China Business Council for Sustainable Development (CBCSD),
and the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, as well as
industry-specific national organizations; all of these have branches at
the subnational level.163 Although some of these organizations are
now formally independent of the state, all retain personnel in
leadership with strong state ties.164 They create forums for leading
companies to share best practices and are active in capacity building
around CSR. 6 5
4.

Mandating

In contrast to most Western governments, China has
demonstrated a greater reliance on mandatory CSR requirements at
the national level, particularly for listed firms, banks, and other
financial institutions. Companies intending to list on China's stock
exchanges must complete supplemental environmental inspections,
those listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange are required to provide
certain environmental disclosures, and China's Code of Corporate
Governance for Listed Companies requires firms to respect the legal

163.
See GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF CSR, supra note 12, at 172-74
(identifying the work of several of these organizations involved in the CSR space). On
one of CANGO's CSR initiatives, see Zhongguo Minzuhui Qiye Shehui Zeren Wangzhan
Xiangmu Gongxu PingtaiJieshao [Introducing the CANGO CSR PortalProject], CHINA
http://www.cango.org/newweb/
2,
2009),
(Nov.
COOPERATION
AsS'N NGO
Shownews..page.asp?ArticleID=964.
See Jonathan Unger & Anita Chan, Associations in a Bind: The Emergence
164.
of Political Corporatism, in ASSOCIATIONS AND THE CHINESE STATE: CONTESTED
SPACES 48, 48-68 (Jonathan Unger ed., 2008) [hereinafter CONTESTED SPACES]
(discussing corporatism); Andrew Watson, Civil Society in a Transitional State: The
Rise of Associations in China, in CONTESTED SPACES, supra, at 14, 22-32 (discussing
the institutional position of these organizations). Some industry associations still
operate under the oversight of particular state agencies, such as MOFCOM and
SASAC. Interview with Daniel Taras, supra note 136. But see Scott Kennedy, The Price
of Competition: The Failed Government Effort To Use Associations To Organize China's
Market Economy, in CONTESTED SPACES, supra, at 149, 149-74 (emphasizing the
independence of these associations).
For example, the CBCSD was founded in 2000 through the initiative of key
165.
leaders at Sinopec and other leading SOEs, as well as the government. It counts major
Western multinationals among its founding members and is promoting a number of
innovative programs to aid its members in promoting CSR concepts throughout their
own business networks and "create a platform for dialogue between international
organizations, government, [and domestic] and foreign business." Interview with
Employee, China Bus. Council for Sustainable Dev. [CBSD], in Beijing, China (June
28, 2011).
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rights of creditors, employees, and other stakeholders, although the
Code lacks clear enforcement mechanisms. 166 CSR guidelines for
banks and other financial institutions issued by the CBRC encourage
policies that uphold stakeholder-oriented principles and require
major banks to issue CSR reports.167
As of 2008, all listed Chinese firms and nonlisted "large- and
medium-sized enterprises" have been required to implement
enterprise risk management systems as well as internal controls
based in part on Sarbanes-Oxley.16 8 Interestingly, the implementing
guidelines for "China SOX" not only include provisions on legal
compliance and financial reporting, but also require firms to take
account of stakeholder-related risks and comply with separate
internal controls guidelines on CSR.' 6 9 Large private enterprises, as
well as small- and medium-sized enterprises, are encouraged to adopt
these standards voluntarily. 170 While all of these guidelines are
drafted as broad standards rather than hard prescriptives, they
illustrate how CSR principles can be embedded in and extend the
reach of mandatory compliance systems.
5.

Principal-Agent Controls

One of the limits of the World Bank typology is its failure to
differentiate the state's role as regulator vis-A-vis private enterprises
and its position vis-A-vis SOEs. Notwithstanding the past decades of

166.
Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (promulgated
by China Sec. Regulatory Comm'n State Econ. & Trade Comm'n, Jan. 7, 2002) 1
ZHENGJIANFA ch. 6 (2002); Guojia Huanjing Baohu Zongju [State Envtl. Prot. Agency],
Guanyu dui Shenqing Shangshide Qiye he Shenqing Zairongzi de Shangshi Qiye
Jinxing Huanjing Baohu Hecha de Tongzhi [Notice Regarding Environmental
Protection Inspection of Companies Prior to Initial and Follow-On Public Offerings],
No. 101, June 16, 2003; SSE CSR Notice, supra note 154 (mandating environmental
disclosures).
167.
See Zhongguo Yinjianhui Bangongting Guanyu Jiaqiang Yinhangye
Jinrong Jigou Shehui Zeren de Yijian [Opinions of the General Office of China Banking
Regulatory Commission on Strengthening the Social Responsibility of Banking
FinancialInstitutions], No. 252, Dec. 5, 2007, available at http://lawinfochina.com; see
also Michael A. Levine, China's CSR Expectations Mature, CHINA Bus. REV. Nov.-Dec.
2008, at 52 (discussing its implementation).
168.
See Ministry of Finance, China Sec. Regulatory Comm'n [CSRC], Nat'l
Audit Office, Qiye Neibu Kongzhi Jiben Guifan [Basic Internal Control Norms for
Enterprises], No. 7, art. 2 (promulgated May 22, 2008, effective July 1, 2009). For
further analysis of these measures, see Virginia Harper Ho, Corporate Governance as
Risk Regulation in China: A Comparative View of Risk Oversight, Risk Management,
andAccountability, 4 EUR. J. RISK REG. 463, 463-65 (2012).
169.
See Ministry of Finance, CSRC, Nat'l Audit Office, CBRC & China Ins.
Regulatory Comm'n, Guanyu Yinfa Qiye Neibu Kongzhi Peitao Zhiyinde Tongzhi
[Notice on the Issuance of Guidelines for the Application, Evaluation, and Auditing of
Enterprise Internal Controls], No. 11, Apr. 15, 2010 (including within the scope of CSR
internal control: production safety, product and service quality, environmental
protection, resource conservation, employment promotion, and employee protection).
170.
Basic Internal Control Norms for Enterprises, supra note 168, art. 2.
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state-sector reforms and the growth of private enterprises, the state
sector continues to dominate the Chinese economy. 171 SOEs are
leaders in outbound investment and are seen as an optimal starting
point for CSR policies given their size, scale, economic impact, and
influence on other firms. 172 Some SOE executives have been
personally at the forefront of CSR initiatives, in part because of their
early exposure to international standards. 173 The state- sector is
significant in many European countries as well, and governments
there have used their position as controlling shareholder of state
enterprises to encourage responsible business practice.174
In China, the state exercises direct and indirect control over
SOEs, not only as controlling shareholder, but also through personnel
management, cross- shareholdings, and direct bureaucratic oversight
by the SASAC. Because of SASAC's direct regulatory and supervisory
authority and the various methods of state direct and indirect control,
voluntary CSR measures are effectively mandatory for SOEs if they
enjoy sufficient policy support. 175 These include the 2006 Enterprise
Risk Management Guidelines for State Enterprises Under Central
State Control, which covers strategic, operational, and legal risk
oversight functions that align with CSR.1 76 In 2008, SASAC also
introduced CSR guidelines for centrally managed SOEs (yangqi A L)
that urge companies to "integrate CSR into corporate governance,
development strategy, and each stage of the business." 177 These

According to some estimates, over 30 percent of the shares of all Chinese171.
listed companies are directly state-owned, and as many as 84 percent of all listed
companies are controlled directly or indirectly by the state. CHAO XI, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA 24-25, 49-51 (2009). On the preferential
policies toward SOEs throughout the reform period, see generally YASHENG HUANG,
CAPITALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE STATE
(2008).
See OECD, supra note 124, 1 17 (describing OECD initiatives to raise
172.
awareness of CSR among Chinese SOEs for these reasons); Interview with Employee,
Global Compact China Liaison Office, in Beijing, China (June 29, 2011).
Interview with Employee, CBCSD, in Beijing, China (June 28, 2011);
173.
Telephone Interview with former Representative, GRI, in Beijing, China (June 29,
2011) (referencing the key role of the Chief Executive Officer of COSCO, a leading
centrally managed SOE, in driving CSR reporting there and by other SOEs).
LOZANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at 86-87 (describing Sweden's
174.
policy directive on CSR promotion for SOEs and related requirements). On the size of
the state sector in OECD member states, see OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: A SURVEY OF OECD COUNTRIES 24-36 (2005).
On SOE governance, see XI, supra note 171, at 22-35, 51-61.
175.
The 2006 ERM Guidelines apply only to the approximately 130 SOEs
176.
directly controlled by the central government. The list of these firms is available at
) [Directory of State-Owned Enterprises], ZHONGGUO
i£Guoqi Minglii ( /
http://www.guozi.org/Gzwsite/cce.htm (last visited Jan. 18,
GUOZIWANG (9BIM~Il),
2013).
State-Owned Assets Supervision & Admin. Comm'n, Guanyu Yinfa
177.
"Guanyu Zhongyang Qiye Liixing Shehui Zeren de Zhidao Yijian" de Tongzhi (_fQF9l
[Notice Regarding the Distributionof
0i)6)
((7if3ff@@-9ff)
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guidelines are framed in voluntary terms, encouraging directors to
issue CSR reports and to consider nonshareholder impacts embodied
in regulatory law in order to carry out the firm's social obligations
and to avoid legal liability.178 Voluntary CSR reporting under the
2008 guidelines may become mandatory in the coming year.17 9 Table
1 of the Appendix modifies the World Bank typology to separately
take these mechanisms into account.
C. Subnational CSR Initiatives
Because of the lack of a national CSR policy or coordination,
subnational government programs in China represent a key source of
policy innovation. The following discussion surveys their role in
advancing CSR. Examples are reported on Table 1 in the Appendix
and more comprehensively below. 8 0
1.

Endorsing

Governments at all levels have been active in raising awareness
of CSR principles. Six provincial-level governments sponsor CSR
award programs, and Shanghai, Shandong, and Zhejiang provinces
have issued formal policy statements publicly endorsing CSR goals
and urging companies to adopt responsible business practices.' 8 1
Provincial and local governments, including Shanghai, Shenzhen, and
several cities in Shandong and Zhejiang provinces, issue CSR

the Guiding Opinion on Implementing CSR in Centrally Managed Enterprises],art. 17
(2008) [hereinafter SASAC CSR Notice], available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/
n20240/n7291323/11899524.html.
178.
Id. arts. 1, 8, 18-19.
179.
Email correspondence from Steven Chan, Dir. of Gov't Relations & CSR
Dep't, Am. Chamber of Commerce, in Shanghai, (Oct. 10, 2012) (on file with author).
180.
For the methodology and sources relied on in this subpart, see supra note
14. The measures reported here are intended to be as comprehensive as possible as of
October 2012. If hot otherwise referenced in the text, citations for all entries reported
in the Tables are on file with the author.
181.
See, e.g., Zhejiangsheng Jingli he Xinxihua Weiyuanhui Guanyu Tuidong
Zhejiangshengji Jingxin Lingyu Xiehui Jiji Kaizhan Shehui Zeren Jianshe de Ruogan

-. fff )

[Zhejiang Provincial Economic and Information Committee Opinion on
UrgingProvincial-LevelAssociations Related to Economic & Information Committees to
Vigorously Promote CSR], No. 536, Sept. 3, 2012 (providing guidance on implementing
CSR),
available
at
http://www.zjjxw.gov.cn/zwgk/tzgg/wjtz/2012/09/24/
2012092400009.shtml; Zhejiangsheng Renmin Zhengfu Guanyu Tuidong Qiye Jiji
Liixing Qiye Shehui Zerende ruogan Yijian (
EMY
ffX) [Some Opinions of the People's Government of Zhejiang Province on
Promoting Enterprises to Vigorously Fulfill Social Responsibilities], No. 19, Feb. 28,
2008
[hereinafter
Zhejiang CSR
Opinion 2008]
(same),
available at
http://www.nbcredit.org/show-news.php?id=645; see also GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF
CSR, supra note 12, at 109-19 (referencing policy guidelines in Shenzhen, Shanghai,
and Changzhou, and in Zhejiang Province).
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82
progress reports for their jurisdictions or highlight CSR leaders.1
Many of these same governments host conferences and other events
83
and some are
to promote CSR within the business community,'
84
actively promoting corporate philanthropy as well.1

Table 2.1: Subnational Governments Endorsing CSR
Local Level
Endorsing:Tools and Provincial Level*
Instruments
Shenzhen
Public procurement
standards
CSR
Shenzhen; Shanghai
Zhejiang, Shanghai
Issues a government
Pudong Dist.; Yiwu
CSR report
(Zhejiang); Weihai
(Shandong)
Shenzhen; Nanjing,
Zhejiang, Shanghai,
Has adopted formal
Changzhou, Wuxi
Shandong
CSR policy or
(Jiangsu); Xiangfan
strategy
(Hubei); Yantai, Weihai
(Shandong); Hangzhou
(Zhejiang)
Shenzhen, Guangzhou
Zhejiang, Tianjin,
Rewards CSR
(Guangdong); Shanghai
Fujian, Chongqing,
leaders/blacklists
Shandong, Shanghai Pudong; Hangzhou, Ningbo
CSR laggards
(Zhejiang); Changzhou,
Wuxi, Nanjing (Jiangsu);
Yantai, Weihai (Shandong)
Various
Shandong,
Sponsors CSR
Guangdong,
conferences and
Zhejiang, Hubei
public campaigns to
promote CSR
*Includes the provincial-level cities directly administered
government: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing.

under

the

central

/
See Li Lei, Shanghai Qiye Shehui Zeren Baogao Shoufa (LiVff
) [Shanghai Issues First CSR Report], HEXUN NEWS (May 15, 2012),
http://stock.hexun.com/2012-05-15/141404737.html;cf. Michael A. Levine, China's CSR
Expectations Mature, 35 CHINA Bus. REV. 50, 50-53 (2008) (discussing the CRS
182.

Sr&

measures of governmental entities, stock exchanges, and NGOs).
See GOVERNMENTS & CSR 2010, supra note 12, at 11 (citing examples from
183.
Shandong, Zhejiang, and Hubei provinces).
See Huzhou Encourages the Private Sector To Implement Social
184.
Responsibility Through Guangcai Program, HUZHOU ONLINE NEWS (Aug. 31, 2009),
http://csr2.mofcom.gov.cn (discussing state efforts to spur contributions by private
entrepreneurs).
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Facilitating.

Many governments endorse and incentivize legal compliance and
"beyond compliance" by creating specific institutions to promote CSR,
introducing local CSR guideline and audit programs, directing
capacity building through firm CSR training and research, and
providing financial incentives. These incentive structures are directly
entwined with alternative enforcement strategies in use by many
administrative agencies at the local level and merge voluntary
commitments with existing legal requirements.
Under China's Administrative Penalties Law (APL), enacted in
1996, enforcement authorities are subject to procedural limits that
are intended to prevent abuse of official discretion. 8 5 Under the APL,
administrative penalties can only be levied if a firm refuses to remedy
the violation upon notice.186 Because enforcement authorities cannot
always threaten serious penalties even with policy backing,187 many
regulatory agencies regularly use a range of compliance-oriented tools
to incentivize compliance and allocate scarce enforcement resources.
These strategies promote responsible business practice up to and
beyond compliance, and so overlap with state-sponsored CSR
programs.
For example, the MEP's green finance programs are
implemented at the provincial and local levels via voluntary
programs that offer tax incentives and direct subsidies to motivate
firms' environmental compliance. 188 Environmental information
disclosure programs, introduced in 2007 and widely implemented by
environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) across China, publicly
blacklist polluters and also publish the names and compliance ratings
of top performers. 18 9 Similar "naming and shaming" strategies are
also widely used by local labor bureaus and quality control

185.
See Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Xingzheng Chufa Fa (94A
Lii
1lEWFM) [Law of the People's Republic of China on Administrative Penalty], art. 3
(promulgated by the Nat'1 People's Cong., Mar. 17, 1996, effective Oct. 1, 1996)
[hereinafter
APL],
translation available at
www.cecc.gov/pages/newLaws/
adminPunishmentENG.php.
186.
Even for "serious" violations where immediate fines can be levied, penalties
must be reduced if corrective action is taken. See id. arts. 23, 27.
187.
In fact, regulatory scholars have found that tough strategies can backfire
both where firms are well-intentioned, and where they are ambivalent about the
legitimacy and reasonableness of regulations. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 1, at
39-43.
188.
Examples are widely reported by the Sino-Swedish CSR Project. See
Provincial and

Local

Initiatives,

SINO-SWEDISH

CORPORATE

SOCIAL

RESP.

COOPERATION, http://csr2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/supplydemandofchinaldemand/
(last
visited Feb. 7, 2013).
189.
See Wanxin Li, Self-Motivated Versus Forced Disclosure of Environmental
Information in China: A Comparative Case Study of the Pilot Disclosure Programmes,
206 CHINA Q. 331 (2011) (discussing these programs).

412

VANDERBIL T/OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 46:375

inspectors. 190 Like many Western regulatory agencies, some
authorities grant enforcement waivers to firms that have consistently
attained an exemplary compliance standard, relieving them from
standard inspections and reporting obligations for a period of time.19 1
Other local governments deny violators access to preferential benefits
or subsidies in lieu of direct penalties.19 2
Local CSR guideline and audit programs are the centerpiece of
many subnational governments' CSR-facilitation efforts and have
been adopted by governments in four provinces, as well as in Tianjin
and Shanghai.' 93 Some have been developed with external technical
assistance from MOFCOM or international experts, but many are the
product of policy entrepreneurs within the provincial or local
government. 194 They 'are generally modeled on international CSR
reporting and audit guidelines, such as the GRI reporting
framework,195 and local governments, like their counterparts in the
United Kingdom, see these guidelines as a way to move companies
gradually toward higher international standards. 196
Local audit programs have typically been run by a CSR working
body set up under the direction of the local Party committee (shiwei
17i 1) and local government, often within a government-affiliated
trade association or trade union office. For example, the Hangzhou

190.
See Zhou Wenting, Company Blacklist for Quality Problems, CHINA DAILY,
Jan. 12, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-01/12/content_14425766.htm
(discussing the "quality credit" system established in 2011 by the General
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine); Interview with
Dist. Food Safety Inspector, in Guangzhou, China (June 13, 2012).
191.
Changzhou's CSR award program was initiated in 2006 and focuses on
labor compliance; winners enjoy a three-year waiver of standard labor, workplace
safety, and health inspections. See GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF CSR, supra note 12, at
113-16. Since 2008, labor bureaus in Ningbo, Zhejiang, have prioritized enforcement
on firms that earn a "C" or "D" on inspections and granting regulatory waivers to firms
that earn high marks of "A" for labor compliance for three years in a row. See id. at
117. In Guangzhou, labor bureaus use a stoplight system with "red," "yellow," and
"green" categories and concentrate their enforcement resources on "red" and "yellow"
firms. See Interview with Dist. Labor Inspector & Arbitrator, in Guangzhou, China.
(Jan. 11, 2009).
192.
See Interview with Employee, City Admin. of Indus. Commerce (June 4,
2011) (discussing environmental enforcement by township and village governments in
Guangdong).
193.
See infra Table 2.2. Tianjin and Shanghai are both provincial-level cities,
but the Tianjin program was, as of this writing, only adopted at the district level.
Shanghai, however, was the first provincial-level government to adopt such a program.
194.
See Interview with Daniel Taras, supranote 136.
195.
Id. The GRI Sustainability Reporting Framework is available at Reporting
Framework Overview, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://www.globalreporting.org/
reporting/reporting-framework-overviewlPages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
On the United Kingdom, see EnvironmentalManagement Systems, INST. OF
196.
ENVTL. MGMT. & ASSESSMENT (Oct. 13, 2008, 8:43 AM), http://www.iema.net/
ems/local.publicauthinfo ("A new British Standard, BS 8555 allows phased
implementation of an EMS leading to full certification to ISO 14001 or registration for
EMAS.").
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City Trade Union spearheaded the establishment of the Hangzhou
CSR Leaders' Working Group, which included seventy officials and
Hangzhou's mayor.1 91 Together, the participants represent twentytwo government units, including the courts. The core working body
includes the heads of eight key departments, such as the local EPB
and the municipal administration of industry and commerce. The
working group engaged academics and other consultants to develop
the guidelines and audit system and coordinates multiple local
agencies during the audit process.1 98
CSR audit systems vary to some extent, but are generally
composed of anywhere from sixty to two hundred discrete measures
that form a point-based matrix covering an entire range of
partners, the
business
consumers,
stakeholders-employees,
government, and disadvantaged populations.' 99 They are intended to
"guide companies to better emphasize legal compliance and business
integrity." 200 Many audit guidelines are striking both for their
sophistication and for their inclusion of basic legal compliance and
core business practice. For example, under Shanghai Pudong's audit
matrix, which is a model for many other governments, basic legal
compliance, such as paying taxes or implementing labor contracts per
Chinese labor law, allows a company to achieve a minimum standard
in each area, but serious violations, such as employing child labor or
experiencing an occupational fatality in the relevant period,
automatically disqualify a firm. 201 Corporate philanthropy or a firm's
adoption of international CSR standards, such as SA8000, also earn
the firm extra points toward local CSR certification, but no extra
points are earned based on the amount of charitable contributions.

197.
Notice on the Establishment of the Hangzhou CSR Leaders' Working
Group, No. 38 (Mar. 22, 2010) (on file with author). Like Hangzhou, Changzhou's CSR
office brings together seven different departments but is spearheaded by the trade
union. GOVERNMENTS & CSR 2010, supra note 12, at 8. Shanghai Pudong's CSR
coordination office was formed under the district economic committee. Pudong Xinqu
Tuijin Qiye Luxing Shehui Zeren de Ruogan Yijian (Xiuding Gao) (
JE ({PiT)) [Pudong New District Opinion on the Promotion of CSR
(Revised Version)], art. 2 (promulgated by Joint Conference of the Pudong New Area
Office for the Establishment of CSR, June 3, 2011) [hereinafter Pudong New District
Opinion], availableat http://csr.pudong.gov.cn/csr bjzfile/2010-06-09/Detail_319398.htm.
Interview with Dir., Hangzhou City Labor Union Legal Affairs Office, in
198.
Hangzhou, China (June 22, 2011) [hereinafter Hangzhou CSR Interview]. This is a
commonly adopted structure. See GOVERNMENTS & CSR.2010, supra note 12, at 8-9.
See, e.g., HANGZHOUSHI, QIYE SHEHUI ZEREN PINGJIA TiXI (rffl1idi LkJ±_
199.
) [HANGZHOU CSR AUDIT SYSTEM] (2010), reprinted in HANGZHOU RIBAO

[HANGZHOU DAILY] (discussing Hangzhou's CSR auditing system, which awards points
based on firms' CSR performance in market responsibility, environmental
responsibility, employment responsibility, and five aspects of social responsibility).
Zhejiang CSR Opinion 2008, supranote 181, art. 4 (translation by author).
200.
See Shanghai CSR Standard, Nov. 25, 2008, together with related
201.
(outlining
application documents, available at http://usercenter/pudong/gov/cn
requirements of social responsibility).
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State policy plays a role as well; for example, establishing a trade
union is required to achieve a minimum score for labor issues, even
though it is not required by Chinese labor law. Similarly, engaging in
collective labor negotiations, which is also encouraged but not
202
mandated, justifies additional points.
Firms voluntarily apply to participate in a two- or three-stage
process that, depending on the jurisdiction, includes a self-audit, a
review by all relevant regulatory authorities of the company's
compliance record, and, in some jurisdictions, an independent thirdparty audit as well.20 3 Because of concerns about the legitimacy of
administrative agency audits and resource constraints, most local
CSR guideline and audit programs rely entirely or in part on thirdparty auditors that the public will perceive to be independent of
government and familiar with international standards. 204 Many
governments
have
also
adopted
pre-award
public-notice
procedures, 20 5 which reduce the likelihood that firms earning CSR
awards or certifications will turn out to be the culprits. in a
compliance-related scandal. In established programs, passage is far
from automatic-in 2012, only 200 of the 1500 firms in Shanghai's
Pudong district that applied for CSR certification passed. 206
Governments that have adopted explicit CSR guideline or award
programs use the same types of incentives as enforcement agencies,
such as regulatory waivers, publicity, access to preferential financing,
expedited permitting, and preference in public procurement; 20 7 other
financial incentives are identical to those that have long been used by
local governments to attract investors. 208

202.
Id.
203.
Most governments currently require all three; Wenzhou, in Zhejiang
province, dispenses with the regulatory review entirely and relies exclusively on the
third-party auditor. GIZ 2010 REPORT, supra note 14, at 30; Interview with Gen. Sec'y,
Shanghai Pudong CSR Office, in Shanghai, China (June 20, 2012) [hereinafter Pudong
CSR Interview]. The third-party auditor is generally selected by the government's CSR
committee or by the firm from an approved list that includes international auditors. Id.
The cost of most audits for first-time applicants is borne by the local government. Id.;
sources cited supra note 198.
204.
Pudong CSR Interview, supra note 203.
205.
Id.
206.
200 Enterprises in Pudong Up to Shanghai'sCSR Standard,JIEFANG DAILY, July
16, 2012, translationavailableat http://www.csr-china.netlen/ second.aspx?nodeid=39dc8010662b-44e2-aeb3-24957bef92b6&page=contentpage&contentid-033b86df-26c6-4654-be8837df3e2280aa.
207.
See, e.g., Pudong New District Opinion, supra note 197, arts. 5-16
(discussing incentives offered by Pudong New District); see also GIZ 2010 REPORT,
supra note 14 (describing incentives offered by various governments); supra note 191
(discussing compliance incentives adopted by Changzhou, Ningbo, and Guanzhou).
208.
These include utility fee waivers, tax breaks, and preferential customs
clearance. GIZ 2010 REPORT, supra note 14.
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Table 2.2: Subnational Governments Facilitatin CSR
Facilitating:Tools and

Provincial Level*

Local Level

Zhejiang, Shandong

Changsha (Hunan);

Instruments

Established an official CSR
office

Shanghai Pudong;
Changzhou, Wuxi
(Jiangsu); Weihai
(Shandong); Shenzhen;
Hangzhou, Ningbo
(Zhejiang)

Grant funding for technology

Widely adopted at the provincial and local levels,

upgrades to meet
environmental targets and/or
create compliance systems

including Shanghai, Heilongjiang, Fujian,
Qinghai, and Tianjin

Tax incentives, subsidies, and

Widely adopted at the provincial and local levels

other cooperative enforcement
incentives for environmental or
labor law compliance

CSR training

Government CSR guidelines
and audit programs

Hebei, Jiangsu,

Shenzhen; Changzhou

Liaoning, Zhejiang,
Shandong

(Jiangsu); Yiwu
(Zhejiang); Weihai
(Shandong)

Shanghai, Shandong,
Jiangsu, Shanxi

Tianjin Binhai; Yiwu,
Hangzhou, Wenzhou,
Taizhou, Ningbo
(Zhejiang); Changsha
(Hunan); Changzhou,
Wuxi, Nanjing
(Jiangsu); Dongying,
Yantai, Yucheng, Weihai
(Shandong)

*Includes the provincial-level cities directly administered
government: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing.

3.

under

the

central

Partnering

Governments at the forefront of CSR in China increasingly frame
their goals in terms of a partnership with business and new
relationships with civil society actors. For example, Zhejiang

Province's 2008 Opinion on Promoting Enterprises to Vigorously
Fulfill Social Responsibilities stresses that "government guides and
enterprises play a leading role."209 Shanghai Pudong's CSR strategy
envisions a "four-party responsibility system" in which "government

209.

Zhejiang CSR Opinion 2008, supra note 181, art. 3.
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guides, business voluntarily [adopts], industry self-regulates, and the
public oversees." 210 Nonetheless, most public-private partnerships
are focused on projects rather than policy, and governments have not
yet directly involved local organizations in CSR working groups.
In recent years, the Sino-German/MOFCOM CSR initiative has
focused on developing public-private partnerships between local
governments and firms to promote sustainability, CSR reporting, and
firm self-regulation. 21 ' Between 2008 and 2012, the project sponsored
one-year CSR training programs for certain firms identified by local
governments in Hebei and Zhejiang provinces in order to increase
local firm interest in CSR. 212 A number of governments, including the
Shandong and Guangdong provincial governments and Shanghai
Pudong's district government, have initiated various research
projects and conferences around CSR, some of which are conducted in
cooperation with local trade associations and academic institutions.
Others directly solicit corporate contributions to development or
charitable projects sponsored by state-approved organizations. 213

210.
Pudong Xinqu Jiakuai Tuijin Jianli Qiye Shehui Zeren Tixi Sannian
Xingdong Gangyao (2011-2013 nian) (
i
ifE
J (2011-2013 f)) [Pudong New District Accelerates Promotion of CSR: Three Year
Action Plan (2011-2013)] (promulgated by the Pudong CSR Comm., June 2011),
reprinted in OFFICE OF PUDONG CSR-SYs.-SETTING JOINT CONFERENCE, PUDONG XINQU
QIYE SHEHUI ZEREN DABIAO PINGGU CAILIAO (
[PUDONG NEW AREA CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ATTAINMENT ASSESSMENT
DATA] 2 (2011) [hereinafter PUDONG CSR ASSESSMENT DATA] (on file with author)
("zhengfu yindao, hangye zilu, qiye ziyuan, shehui jiandu").
211.
See Public-Private Partnership (PPP), SINO-GERMAN CORP. Soc. RESP.
PROJECT, http://www.chinacsrproject.org/Highlights/PPP-EN.asp (last visited Feb. 7,
2013).
See id. (discussing several of these programs); Interview with Daniel Taras,
212.
supranote 136.
Interview with Local Official, City Admin. of Indus. & Commerce, in
213.
Guangdong Province, China (June 4, 2011).
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Table 2.3: Subnational Governments PartneringAround CSR
Partnering:Tools and
ProvincialLevel*
Local Level
Instruments

CSR training and other
capacity building
Collaborative research
and information
dissemination
Integration of trade
associations in CSR
steering committees
NGO collaboration
around pollution
reduction
Facilitating corporate

Hebei, Zhejiang,
Guangdong
Shandong,
Guangdong

Yiwu, Wenzhou
(Zhejiang)
Shanghai Pudong

Shanghai Pudong;
Wuxi (Jiangsu)
Guangdong

Tianjin Binhai

Various

philanthropy

*Includes the provincial-level cities directly administered under the central
government: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing.

4.

Mandating

In a number of jurisdictions, the introduction of state-backed
CSR has explicitly been matched by enhanced enforcement of
environmental, labor, and consumer-protection laws. 214 Most Chinese
sources on state sponsorship of CSR tend to highlight core legislation
as primary evidence of state commitments. 215 However, few
subnational governments are experimenting with mandatory CSR
requirements. Exceptions include Shenzhen's public procurement
requirements, which incorporate CSR standards; 216 Shandong's rules
that include CSR within the quality inspection bureau's brand
evaluation system; 2 17 and a few cities that are including all local
enterprises in their CSR audit systems. 2 18

214.

See GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF CSR, supra note 12, at 109-11, 113-17

(citing as examples Shenzhen, Ningbo, and Changzhou).
215.
216.

See, e.g., GOVERNMENTS & CSR 2010, supra note 12.
See GIZ 2010 REPORT, supra note 14, at 43 (discussing the public

procurement rules). Other jurisdictions, such as Shanghai Pudong, offer public
procurement preferences as an incentive to facilitate CSR performance. See Pudong
New District Opinion, supra note 197, art. 13.
217.
These were introduced in 2009. See Brohier, supra note 14, at 22 tbl.3
(indicating that in 2009, the Shandong Provincial Quality Inspection Department
"[s]tarted including CSR in its brand evaluation system").
218.
See, e.g., China Env't News, Weihai Includes CSR in Year-End Performance
Rating, SINO-SWEDISH CORP. Soc. RESP. (CSR) COOPERATION (Mar. 19, 2011, 11:12 AM),
http://csr2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/supplydemandofchinaldemand/201005/20100506905752.h
tml (describing Weihai's mandatory evaluation system). Certain companies in Yiwu,
Zhejiang, are also required to undergo CSR audits. See GIZ 2010 REPORT, supra note
14, at 26.

418

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 46:375

D. A Synopsis
The above survey indicates that many national agencies and
subnational governments are pursuing explicit policy initiatives to
promote CSR. Not surprisingly, most programs focus on
environmental protection or sustainability, while others emphasize
labor issues, consumer protection, or philanthropy; guidelines and
audit programs naturally span multiple areas of existing regulation.
Many encompass not only legal compliance, but also what might
otherwise be viewed as basic business practice; for example, providing
good customer service, improving product quality, and implementing
contract management systems. 219 Human rights standards, however,
are often expressly excised from China-specific CSR standards and
programs. 220
In addition, state promotion of CSR does not follow a uniform
model at the national or subnational levels. As in the United States,
the leading central ministries-the MEP and MOFCOM-are those
whose core mission is already closely linked to CSR. 221 At the
subnational level, many provincial and local governments are active
only in certain policy domains or utilize only select tools, while others,
particularly in the Shandong and Zhejiang provinces, adopt a range
of strategies, representing a deeper commitment to CSR.
One interesting conclusion that emerges from publicly reported
CSR initiatives is that, with the exception of programs focused on
corporate philanthropy and economic development, both voluntary
and mandatory state-backed CSR programs are directed at moving
companies toward legal compliance while rewarding companies who
do more. A further conclusion is that CSR efforts by both national and
subnational government generally focus on facilitating CSR practices
through voluntary programs and a mix of traditional and cooperative
regulatory incentives, particularly for private enterprises. This
emphasis on voluntary measures is well supported by prior studies on
regulatory compliance incentives in China. 22 2 Mandatory initiatives

219.
See, e.g., SASAC CSR Notice, supra note 177, art. 8 (regarding business
integrity and respect for law and contract); id. art. 9 (regarding appropriate allocation
of resources, lowering operating costs, and improving management and governance
structures); id. arts. 10, 12 (regarding improving product quality and innovation); SEZ
Guidelines, supra note 154, art. 20 (urging honesty toward suppliers and customers);
Shandong Sheng Shou Hetong Zhong Xinyong Qiye Rending Guanli Banfa (l/Aff#
[Shandong Measures on Designation of Enterprises as
/)
"Respecting Contractsand Emphasizing Integrity'", SDACR, May 14, 2011, available at
http://www.sd-acr.com/web/sd-acr/news-1305337527953.html.
220.
See Pudong CSR Interview, supra note 203; see also Lin, supra note 9, at
66.

221.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 20 (reporting as of 2007 that the U.S.
Department of Commerce and the EPA were the most active CSR supporters).
222.
For example, one recent study comparing voluntary and mandatory pilot
environmental disclosure programs in Jiangsu and Inner Mongolia found that the
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tend to be directed toward firms over which the state exercises
stronger control, due to their scale, sector, or ownership structure.
Thus, the most stringent requirements and guidelines have been
introduced first for SOEs under central government control, then for
other SOEs, and then, via securities regulation and stock exchange
rules, for listed companies. Similarly, under central leadership, CSR
directives and guidelines have proliferated for banks and other
financial institutions ahead of other sectors.
These developments raise fundamental questions about the
motivation of state sponsorship of CSR in China, particularly at the
local level-in short, why would local governments that balk at tough
enforcement push companies "beyond compliance"? A first response is
simply that they're not. Many of the governments that are promoting
CSR are also beginning to toughen enforcement, in part because of
shifting development strategies. 223 At the same time, the flexibility of
CSR concepts allows governments whose regulatory enforcement
practices are inconsistent to emphasize aspects of CSR that are easily
attainable or to focus on rewarding compliant enterprises rather than
altering enforcement priorities. Answering the question of
government motivations empirically presents difficulties, and
individual officials' motivations for supporting a local government
role in CSR (or not) inevitably vary. However, based on interviews
with representatives of international organizations, local government
agencies, and trade associations, several key drivers of government
CSR activity consistently emerge. Interestingly, many are identical to
those identified in prior studies of state-backed CSR in the European
Union and in other emerging markets. 224
As discussed above, central economic development policies now
directly support and motivate the proliferation of local government
CSR programs. At the subnational level, local officials also have
personal incentives to prioritize legal compliance and CSR goals, as
performance standards for local leaders increasingly include targets
for sustainable development; developing a CSR program can be seen
as innovative, distinguishing local leadership when they are
evaluated for advancement. 225 Local officials can also face penalties if

success of a mandatory disclosure program was hindered by its dependence on local
leaders' commitment and resources, while voluntary programs driven by
environmental NGOs produced observable effects on company practice and public
perception. See Li, supra note 189, at 334.
223.
See Hangzhou CSR Interview, supra note 198; Pudong CSR Interview,
supra note 203; text accompanying supra note 214. On environmental enforcement, see
generally Benjamin van Rooij & Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Fragile Convergence:
UnderstandingVariation in the Enforcement of China'sIndustrialPollution Law, 32 L.
& POL'Y 14 (2010).
224.
See text accompanying supra notes 43-44 (listing drivers of government
CSR policies).
225.
Interview with Representative, Guangdong Civil Affairs Bureau, in
Guangzhou,China (June 4, 2011). On performance evaluation, see generally Alex L.
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social unrest occurs on their watch, making grassroots pressure an
important driver of CSR public policies. 226 In fact, as in the United
Kingdom, many local governments, including Hangzhou and Ningbo
in Zhejiang province, adopted local CSR policies as a response to local
labor crises and environmental pressures. 227
Beyond these internal drivers, local governments also look to
CSR programs to out-compete other local jurisdictions for high-tech or
high-value-added investment projects. 228 Others, like their Western
counterparts, see CSR as a tool to improve the international
competitiveness of local companies. 229 As this logic goes, international
investors and consumers will have greater confidence in local
suppliers and greater assurance of a level playing field for investment
if local companies are being held to higher compliance standards or
have been passed by credible assurance audits.
Not surprisingly, then, regional economic and political
characteristics are shaping CSR policies in unique ways. Most local
guidelines and multifaceted CSR programs are being developed in
centers of foreign investment, export-oriented industry, or private
entrepreneurship. Shanghai, for example, is a hub for foreign direct
investment; Shandong, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu provinces, also CSR
leaders, are dominated by private enterprises that have historically
been well-known for entrepreneurship. 230 Nearly all local
governments developing CSR guidelines are located in special
development zones (kaifa qu ff IX) or comprehensive experimental
reform zones (zonghe peitao gaige shidian r 1Z1_
& id A)
iR
designated by the State Council. Although government promotion of

Wang, The Search for SustainableLegitimacy: Environmental Law and Bureaucracy in
China, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); see also, e.g., Press Release,
Xinhua, Zhejiang Jiang Huanjing Anquan Baozhang Naru Zhengfu Zeren Kaohe
[Zhejiang To Include Environmental Protection in Government Responsibility
Evaluation] (Feb. 15, 2011).
226.
See Hon S. Chan & Jie Gao, Performance Measurement in Chinese Local
Governments, 41 CHINESE L. & GOV'T. 4, 8 (2008) (noting that the political goals of
maintaining a stable and harmonious society are key measures in performance
evaluation of local officials); Jie Gao, Governing by Goals and Numbers: A Case Study
in the Use of Performance Measurement To Build State Capacity in China, 29 PUB.
ADMIN. DEV. 21, 29 (2009) (same).
227.
See GIZ 2010 REPORT, supra note 14, at 34; Hangzhou CSR Interview,
supra note 198.
See GIZ 2010 REPORT, supra note 14, at 1 (discussing intergovernmental
228.
competitiveness).
See, e.g., Pudong CSR Interview, supra note 203. For example,
229.
representatives of the German government CSR initiative observe that the local
government in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province, is "very proactive [about CSR].... They
want to create a 'Wenzhou' brand, to have Wenzhou known as a center for responsible
business." Interview with Daniel Taras, supra note 136. On Western experience, see
Aaronson & Reeves, supra note 58, at 50-52.
230.
An interesting exception is Guangdong, where local governments have
taken a less active role in guiding CSR activities, perhaps because of its continued
reliance on low-cost manufacturing.
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CSR is not limited to the developed eastern coastal provinces, these
trends suggest that local economic development is an important
precondition for governments to become early CSR adopters.
Early empirical evidence by Chinese scholars suggests that
state-backed policies are having some influence, at least in raising
awareness of CSR issues in certain sectors. 231 However, many
subnational programs remain preliminary and relatively unknown,
even among key firms and government stakeholders. 232 Since most of
the initiatives described here are less than five years old, further
empirical research is needed to assess their outcomes and impacts.
What this preliminary overview does suggest is that the role of the
state in advancing CSR in China is much more central than in either
the European relational model or a market-led approach.

IV. A STATE-CENTRIC MODEL OF CSR

The dominant paradigms for understanding the role of the state
in promoting CSR are the market-based model adopted by the United
States, which assumes a near-absence of government in the CSR
space, and the relational model, which has been used to describe CSR
policies in Europe and assumes an active role for governments in
promoting CSR. 233 Both envision a fairly clear divide between public
and private sectors and a strong role for market forces, civil society,
and self-regulation. In both models, governments generally take an
indirect mediating or reinforcing role. In post-reform China, a very
different pattern has emerged-a state-centric model of CSR.
Table 3 illustrates these approaches as ideal types, with each
row representing a point on a spectrum from left to right. For
example, the U.S. approach is largely a market-driven model, but as
Part II noted, some U.S. governments also adopt relational strategies,
engaging with private actors around sustainability or other CSR
goals. Within China as well, provinces with a strong privateenterprise base and independent business organizations, such as

231.
For example, one recent survey of bank managers in Guangdong province
found high levels of awareness (over 80 percent) of CSR-related rules and guidelines for
financial institutions. See, e.g., Wang Hongyi, Guangdong Bank Survey Analysis (June
2012) (unpublished report on file with author). A high percentage trace their office's
CSR commitment to government initiatives. See id. (reporting that 59.8 percent of
those surveyed identify the CBRC as having the greatest influence on their CSR
commitment).
232.
For example, several officials, lawyers, and even firm managers responsible
for CSR that I interviewed in cities that have adopted local CSR guidelines and audit
systems had no idea that the guidelines were being implemented, or in some cases,
that they existed at all.
233.
See generally infra Part II.B.
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Zhejiang, might develop more relational approaches to CSR. 2 34 Also
included is a third distinct model: for lack of a better term, the
"socialist model" of CSR, which reflects the contribution of state
enterprises to stakeholder welfare under a planned economy.
Although particular economic or political systems are not necessary
elements of the three models introduced here, governments with
similar institutional contexts may be more likely to adopt similar
approaches toward CSR. 235

234.
My research did not identify any examples of CSR engagement in these
areas, nor does it presume a natural evolution from one model to another.
235.
While I make no attempt here to confirm this hypothesis, it is supported in
part by much of the research on path dependency in corporate law and policy. See, e.g.,
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in CorporateOwnership
and Governance, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 74-

77 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark R. Roe eds., 2004).
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Table 3: State-Centric CSR in Comparative Perspective
Adopter

MarketDriven Model - RelationalModel-StateCentricModel
<-United States->

-)

Socialist Model

European Union->
China
(post-2

P-- Relannm
China
Instruments

Market-Based
Social labeling
Consumer and investor monitoring
Self-regulation (e.g. corporate & industry codes of

conduct)
Voluntary disclosures
Voluntary assurance systems (e.g. ISO 14001)

private
sectors
Robust civil
society
Limited state
role
Leading
business and
civil society
role

State Roles
CSR

State-Based
Endorsing (e.g. information
dissemination, CSR awards)
Facilitating (e.g. developing CSR
guidelines, incentives)
Partnering (e.g. public-private
CSR partnerships, facilitating
dialogue)
Mandating (e.g. mandatory CSR

State-Based
Managerial and
bureaucratic control
SOEs as economic, social,
and political actors (qiye
ban shehui).

sectors
Robust civil
society

No independent civil
society
No independent business
strategizing or goal
State social welfare policy
advanced by firms

Some state
promotion of
CSR
Leading
business & civil
society role

private
sectors
Weak civil
society
Some state
promotion of
CSR
Weak
business &
civil society

Passive

Supporter/Partner

Supporter
rin

CSRpr

In Table 3, the market-driven model represents the most limited
role for the state in advancing CSR, and the socialist model
represents the most extensive. In a centrally planned economy, the
enterprise's responsibility to its employees, suppliers, local
communities, and other stakeholders is integrated with the economic
goals set by the state plan, and economic efficiency may ultimately be
less important than these broader interests from the state's
perspective. 23 6 For firms within the state bureaucracy, 2 3 7 the state

236. For a synopsis of state enterprise
aeform
management during the
perid, see
Xi, supra note 171, at 8-18.
237.
During the 1980s, a growing proportion of economic activity in China was
in fact carried out hy township-village enterprises and private enterprises even before

424

VANDERBILT/OURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 46:375

stands in both a principal-agent and regulator-regulatee relationship
to the firm and exercises total control over management and all
operational decisions. State enterprises give the state a source of
funds and personnel to deal with pressing social problems, but any
externalities of firm operations can only be addressed by the state
itself. With the advent of market reforms in the late 1980s and early
1990s, China largely abandoned this model, although some of its
governance elements persist with respect to state enterprises.2 3 8
In a state-centric CSR model, national and subnational
government actors are not only regulators-they are also firms' most
important stakeholders and hold the key to essential business
relationships. Not surprisingly, internal responsibility for promoting
and coordinating CSR programs in many Chinese firms is allocated to
government relations departments.239 Close institutional, relational,
and bureaucratic ties between the state and the business community
give governments multiple avenues of influence and control in the
CSR space, beyond the state's direct role in legislation, enforcement,
and explicit policymaking. 240 These linkages are ubiquitous and often
opaque. 241
However, in contrast to the socialist model, nonstate actors and
market forces shape firm incentives in a way that is largely absent in
a command economy. 242 In China, for example, international
consumer and NGO pressure has historically played the most direct
role in influencing firm adoption of codes of conduct and other CSR
standards. 243 With the exception of state enterprises, governments in
the state-centric model do not rely on direct managerial or
bureaucratic control to promote CSR (or any other economic or social
goals).
their existence was formally legalized. On this history, see generally HUANG, supra
note 171; KELLEE TSAI, CAPITALISM WITHOUT DEMOCRACY: THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2007).
The state sector still remains generally subject to bureaucratic controls;
238.
however, as a result of state sector reforms, all state firms must respond to market
forces that push toward or against the state's social welfare goals. See generally CHAO
XI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA (2009). Therefore, modern
SOEs no longer represent a pure form of the socialist command approach to CSR.
Interview with former government affairs department employee, domestic
239.
firm, in Guangzhou, China (June 1, 2012); Interview with Commc'ns Manager, foreigninvested firm, in Shanghai, China (June 20, 2012).
On the basic institutional structures that facilitate these dynamics, see
240.
TONY SAICH, GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS OF CHINA 142-78 (3d ed. 2011).
See, e.g., Bo Xilai's Clan Links, Bus. WK., Apr. 23, 2012 (tracing the
241.
business and personal connections of the disgraced Bo Xilai and Gu Kulai).
On nonstate drivers of firm CSR practice in China, see Lin, supranote 9, at
242.
89-99. While the three models introduced here do not generally presume a certain
underlying economic or political system, the respective roles of the state and of
enterprises in the socialist model are, in a pure form, only possible within a planned
economy.
See THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CSR, supra note 118, at 53-59 (discussing
243.
these drivers of firm CSR practice); Chan, supra note 122 (same).
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The state-centric and relational models appear to have much in
common. Governments in a state-centric model may adopt many of
the same tools and instruments to advance CSR as governments
following a relational approach, and for many of the same reasons. In
particular, both may embrace "new governance" forms because they
see harnessing the influence of international standard-setting
organizations, economic institutions, trading partners, internal
management, and civil society as important mechanisms of informal
social control. 24 4 At the same time, state agencies in a relational
approach may, like those in a state-centric model, encourage,
coordinate, and even drive CSR strategies that involve these third
parties. 245
The critical difference is that in the state-centric model, the state
is unwilling to cede control over CSR initiatives and policymaking to
other actors and is not an impartial partner with business or
mediator of firm-stakeholder engagement. In China, a state-centric
approach means that the Party and government officials guide both
regulatory priorities and CSR policy and that organizations without
state ties have few avenues to influence either of these or firm
behavior. Accordingly, state promotion of CSR in the state-centric
model is not a complement to, but to some extent a substitute for,
voluntary firm activity, independent civil society efforts, or market
demand. Indeed, several observers interviewed for this study
emphasized that the government was doing too much too fast,
crowding out other stakeholders who lack an independent voice. 24 6
The distinction between the relational and state-centric
approaches is most apparent with respect to "intermediary
organizations"-the (semi)public actors that assist government in
developing CSR public policies and serve as an interface between
governments, business, and civil society or the public. 247 Prior studies
have found that intermediary organizations are essential to the
success of state-backed CSR. 248 In the West, governments have
enlisted business organizations or NGOs to fill this role, or have
themselves created new intermediary institutions, as the United

244.
Gunningham, supra note 62, at 115.
245.
See, e.g., LOZANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at 116 ("[T]he weight of
the three social actors (i.e. government, business, and civil society) and the relationship
between them depend greatly on the historical context of each country.. . . [I]t is often
the governments who drive and foster the inclusion of these actors.").
246.
Interview with Consultant, BSR, in Beijing, China (June 27, 2011);
Interview with CSR Manager, foreign-invested firm, in Guangzhou, China (June 29,
2012).

247.
See LOZANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at 164-65 (describing the role
of intermediary organizations).
248.
See id.
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Kingdom, Germany, and Denmark have done. 249 However, in a
relational model, outcomes or agendas may be shaped equally by
other participants, even when the state plays a leading role in
establishing intermediary organizations and facilitating dialogue. 250
In China, numerous actors can also influence the policy
process. 251 However, with the exception of various international
organizations, intermediary organizations leading in the CSR space,
such as the CSR committees established by many local governments,
are not neutral mediators but are embedded within the party-state
apparatus. Indeed, CSR is to be carried out under Party leadership,
and Party-affiliated mass organizations, such as labor unions and the
All-China Women's Federation branches, have been encouraged to
make CSR promotion part of their mission. 252 Although some
governments have made engagement with business and civil society a
key goal, these partners generally do not set the scope and objectives
of that engagement. 253 The limited number of domestic trade
associations and civil society organizations that governments have
engaged with to create or promote CSR initiatives are positioned to
do so because they too maintain strong ties to the party-state, or are
in fact "government NGOs" or official industry organizations. China's
homegrown civil society organizations find that their range of
movement is bounded by the state through controls on their
establishment and operations, and they lack the influence necessary
to push firms to embrace CSR. 254
A comparison of Figure 2, created by the CSR Research Center of
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, with the three-way
relational model introduced in Figure 1 above, emphasizes most
clearly the distinctions between a state-centric and a relational
approach. Figure 2 represents the typical structure of local

249.
See, e.g., id. at 108-09, 165-75 (discussing examples from Germany, Italy,
and Denmark, among others); Moon, supra note 3 (discussing the UK and Irish
governments' experience).
250.
See Albareda et al., supra note 3, at 350 (describing the role of the state as
a neutral mediator).
251.
Case studies illustrate this complexity. See, e.g., Young Nam Cho, The
Politics of Lawmaking in Chinese Local People's Congresses, 187 CHINA Q. 592, 593
(2006) (discussing labor and consumer-protection legislation); Kennedy, supra note 164
(outlining industry opposition to state-directed cartels).
252.
See, e.g., SASAC CSR Notice, supra note 177, 1 20 (describing the
leadership and CSR mission of party institutions).
253.
Pudong CSR Interview, supra note 203.
254.
See generally Andrew Watson, Civil Society in a Transitional State: The
Rise of Associations in China, in CONTESTED SPACES, supra note 164 (discussing these
limits). Scholars of civil society routinely observe that there is a direct relationship
between an organization's ties to the state and its capacity to accomplish its social
mission. See, e.g., Joseph Y.S. Cheng, Kinglun Ngok & Wenjia Zhuang, The Survival
and Development Space for China's Labor NGOs: Informal Politics and Its Uncertainty,
50 ASIAN SURV. 1082, 1083 (2010); Watson, supranote 164.

2013/

BEYOND REGULATION

427

government CSR policy promotion bodies. 255 Most striking is that the
relationships that are critical to advancing CSR are those within the
party-state.-All of the civil society organizations referenced in Figure
2 are also state-affiliated. The state-firm dimension is notably
missing, implying that the defining relationships in CSR are internal
to the state.

Figure 2: State-CentricRelational Governance

Source: GOVERNMENTS & CSR 2010, supra note 12, at 9.

In China, then, a state-centric approach is not only the natural
outgrowth of the Chinese political and institutional structure, but
also an inevitable outcome of the party-state's influence on all three
sides of the relational triangle-as market player, as intermediary, as
sponsor or patron of civil society and business organizations, and as
controlling shareholder of state enterprises. Beyond China, a statecentric CSR model could conceivably emerge in countries with greater
separation between the state, firms, and civil society actors, assuming
governments retain direct control over CSR policymaking and
influence over firms and civil society. 256 Indeed, if, as in China, the
state maintains a monopoly on political power and civil society

This structure was confirmed by numerous interviewees in this study. See,
255.
e.g., Hangzhou CSR Interview, supra note 198.
Within the OECD, France's highly regulatory approach to CSR represents
256.
the closest example. See LOZANO, ALBAREDA & YSA, supra note 3, at 119-26.
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pressures are weak, CSR is unlikely to advance without government
involvement.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR NORM CREATION AND LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION
As this Article has demonstrated thus far, the question of the
state's role in advancing CSR is not whether governments will
address this new policy arena but why, how, and with what effect.
Parts II through IV have addressed the initial questions of why and
how governments are approaching CSR and have placed China's
efforts in comparative context. This Part considers how state
sponsorship of CSR intersects with positive law and how the success
(or failure) of these programs is likely to influence norm creation and
legal compliance in China.
It is important to emphasize at the outset that both represent
something of an uphill battle in China, as they are at odds with the
entire thirty-year history of its enterprise reform. Since the start of
reform, the close link between law and state policy, the pragmatic
experimentalism of Deng Xiaoping and his successors, and tensions
between central and local governments meant that law has been
neither transparent, predictable, nor uniformly enforced. 25 7 Legal and
policy barriers to the existence of private enterprise during the 1980s
forced entrepreneurs to engage in adaptive and informal coping
strategies to survive. Because the complicity of local officials in
ignoring legal barriers was necessary, this context created enormous
opportunities for patronage and rent seeking to flourish in a business
culture already grounded on relational ties. 2 58 Throughout the reform
period, growth-based economic targets fueled the hypercompetitiveness of the Chinese market, pushing firms to cut costs
regardless of the consequences and local governments to turn a blind
eye to noncompliance. This context helps explain the fundamental
shifts that companies and governments must make to understand,
much less embrace, corporate accountability, CSR, and legal
compliance itself.
A. Regulatory Convergence and Networked Incentives
To be sure, evasion and creative compliance, that is, following
the letter of the law but not its spirit, are common responses to

257.

See generally IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

CHINA (Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2000) (analyzing a variety of problems involved in
implementing and enforcing laws and regulatory reform).
258.
See HUANG, supra note 171, at 224. See generally TSAI, supra note 237

(discussing the foundations of adaptive strategies).
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regulation worldwide.2 59 In fact, research has shown that even in the
West, companies' incentives to comply with law are influenced
equally (and often more powerfully) by market forces, cultural norms,
and companies' internal constraints. 260 Accordingly, regulatory
scholars find that individuals and firms exhibit higher levels of
voluntary legal compliance, conformity with informal norms, and
willingness to cooperate with regulatory authorities when they are
subject to a "networked" regulatory regime in which multiple
incentive structures are convergent and mutually reinforcing. 261
State-backed CSR has the potential to contribute to this type of
regime because it brings together formal and informal governance
tools, law and policy, and public and private governance structures
across diverse regulatory arenas.
However, as Neil Gunningham has noted, none of these
accountability tools create independent, unidirectional, and
unambiguous pressures toward firm compliance, as the CSR and
regulatory literatures have often claimed. 262 In fact, he argues, they
gain force through mutual interaction and are often negotiated and
contested. 263 In order to capture this complexity, Gunningham
conceives of a firm as possessing a collective license to operate that
includes (i) its market license to operate as a profitable business,
which is negotiated with shareholders, creditors, consumers, and
other financial stakeholders; (ii) its legal license, which is negotiated
with relevant authorities as well as citizens and NGOs; and (iii) a
social license conferred by consumers, the voting public, and other
stakeholders. 264 Consistent with standard contractual theories of the
firm, this collective license is the product of the negotiated
interactions between the firm and its stakeholders, and their

See, e.g., TSAI, supra note 237, at 45-54 (describing how entrepreneurs co259.
opted legal forms to survive before private firm ownership was formally permitted).
See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 1, at 20-35 (discussing compliance
260.
incentives).
See id. at 35-40 (developing the well-known tiered enforcement pyramid);
261.
see also CORPORATE LAWBREAKING AND INTERACTIVE COMPLIANCE 143-65 (Jay A.
Sigler & Joseph E. Murphy eds., 1991) (advocating the integration of cooperative
enforcement tools); Richard M. Locke, Fei Qin & Alberto Brause, Does Monitoring
Improve Labor Standards? Lessons from Nike, 61 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3 (2007)
(finding a correlation between effective national laws and improved compliance with
codes of conduct). See generally J. LISTER, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
STATE (2011) (exploring the intersection of multiple enforcement regimes related to
sustainable forestry); van Rooij & Lo, supra note 223 (discussing overlapping strategies
in pollution enforcement in China).
See generally Neil Gunningham, Corporate Environmental Responsibility:
262.
Law and the Limits of Voluntarism, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 476, 480
(McBarnet et al. eds., 2007). By "unidirectional," Gunningham refers to expectations
that law and other pressures on firms will push them toward voluntary CSR practices.
Id. Gunningham's definition of CSR is limited to "voluntary and unenforceable action
beyond what is required by law." Id. at 477.
Id. at 480.
263.
Id. at 480-82.
264.
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competing interests create tensions between the three licenses that
must be balanced by the firm. 26 5
1.

State-Centric CSR and the Collective License to Operate

Gunningham's analytical framework offers a useful starting
point for understanding the potential effect of state CSR policies on
firm compliance and on law itself. As he explains, the legal license
(i.e., regulatory requirements) can expand the social license (i.e.,
CSR's normative dimensions) and vice versa, with the economic
license often setting a floor on the firm's response to these
pressures. 266 State-centric CSR initiatives in China offer ready
examples of the dynamics he describes, with the added gloss that for
firms there, the state is a relevant stakeholder in all three licenses,
not just the regulatory license.
At the outset, the regulatory and social licenses intersect in some
fairly obvious ways. 267 For example, if serious regulatory violations
trigger a public outcry or labor protests, this compromise of the firms'
social license puts pressure on governments to tighten monitoring
and enforcement or enact new regulations. 26 8 State promotion of
voluntary firm CSR practices may reduce this risk. 269 Governmentbacked CSR audit programs, like most corporate and industry codes
of conduct, merge the two licenses since they include basic compliance
as a minimum requirement. So do mandatory CSR measures, such as
listed company sustainability reporting or sustainability measures in
internal controls, which embed soft CSR dimensions in hard
regulation. In Shanghai, local agency enforcement priorities-also
part of the legal license-are directly factored into the CSR audit
review process, as well as into the weights assigned to different
compliance elements. Therefore, legal compliance directly influences
whether firms enjoy the reputational benefits of government CSR
certification-in other words, an enhanced social license. 270
Less obviously, both mandatory and voluntary CSR measures
represent a legal expansion of the social license. For example, CSR
disclosure rules give the public and other social stakeholders access to
information that can increase public expectations toward the firm,

265.
Id. As he acknowledges, additional interactions are also possible; a more
complex treatment is beyond the scope of this Article.
266.
Id. at 483-93.
267.
There are many other possibilities, some highlighted in Gunningham's
work. Id. at 483-87.
268.
Id. at 483. Media is a powerful force in the contemporary Chinese legal
system. See generally Benjamin Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the
Chinese Legal System, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2005).
269.
See McBarnet, supra note 2, at 28-29 (addressing the related critique of
CSR as a substitute for law).
270.
Pudong CSR Interview, supra note 203.
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even though independent audits are not currently required and the
quality of CSR reports is therefore highly variable. 271 Governments'
endorsement of CSR can empower the public to more actively monitor
corporate social impacts and challenge compliance violations even
when enforcement is otherwise weak. 272 Indirectly, a firm's support
for the local government's CSR audit program, charitable cause, or
other CSR initiative not only strengthens the firm's legal license by
fostering positive relationships with regulators but also creates
reputational benefits that enhance the firm's social license; good
government relations also broaden the firm's access to customers and
business partners, strengthening its economic license.
China's CSR programs also illustrate how the firm's social
license impacts its legal license. From an enforcement standpoint,
voluntary participation in most government CSR audit programs
entitles participants to a short-term inspection waiver from various
enforcement agencies (the regulatory license) and to various financial
benefits (the economic license). 27 3 If a firm's social license has been
breached-for example, if the firm has lost consumer litigation or
been the subject of a media report highlighting compliance violations,
the firm may also be ineligible for CSR certification and the
opportunity to earn these rewards. 274 In some jurisdictions, low
ratings on a local government CSR audit might place a firm on a
blacklist that triggers more frequent regulatory inspections by
administrative agencies and disqualifies it from certain state-funded
incentives. 27 5
One of the potential advantages of state-centric CSR for legal
(and policy) implementation is that the state can influence all
dimensions of the firm's collective license, and in China, the state also
has many more avenues to do so than governments elsewhere. For
example, China's emphasis on mandatory rules for public-sector
enterprises, state agencies, and listed firms (most of which are state
controlled) 276 is an effective way to endorse CSR and lead by example

271.
Mandating independent auditing of sustainability reports may not resolve
the problem, given the deep questions that have emerged about accounting fraud and
audit failures impacting the financial reports of many Chinese firms in recent years.
See Chinese Accounting Earns Tough Stance, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2012, at C12
(discussing ongoing investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board).
272.
This is in fact an explicit goal of many state-backed CSR programs. See,
e.g.,
Shanghai Municipal Local Standards of CSR, Nov.
11,
2009,
http://csr.pudong.gov.cn/csr-bjz-csras/List/list_0.htm
(mandating that enterprises
evaluate CSR implementation on a regular basis and disclose the results to employees
and the public).
273.
See supra notes 191, 207-208 and accompanying text.
274.
See, e.g., ShanghaiMunicipal Local Standardsof CSR, supra note 272.
275.
See id.
276.
See XI, supra note 171, at 24-25, 49-51 (estimating that as many as 80 to
90 percent of all listed companies are directly or indirectly controlled by the state).
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in sectors where ensuring compliance presents fewer challenges. 277
Government-sponsored CSR policy guidelines are generally drafted in
broad terms, but can establish standards that better convey the
"spirit" of the law. Rather than developing new CSR codes and
guidelines, governments at the provincial level and above could work
to standardize local CSR guidelines. In other words, governments
might engage in "meta-regulation," that is, the regulation of "selfregulation."27 8 Governments in China could also use their influence to
expand avenues for firm stakeholder and civil society engagement.
State-centric CSR therefore has great potential to promote regulatory
convergence and broaden the network of incentives companies face.
2.

State-Centric CSR and Filling Governance Gaps

The fact that state-centric CSR is embedded in positive law and
backed by the state is, however, precisely why it is unlikely to
address underlying deficiencies in the implementation of existing
laws and regulations. Most critically, the viability of state-centric
voluntary tools depends upon the capacity and will of state agencies
and government officials. Although most scholars see the ability to
overcome governance gaps as a key motivator of state CSR policy,27 9
state-centric CSR is inherently subject to the same constraints that
weaken traditional regulation. 280
It is no coincidence that leading CSR adopters are governments
located along China's more affluent eastern coast. Those regions are
more likely to have a significant number of companies that are
financially able to bear the increased operating costs that compliance
requires and to have governments with the fiscal capacity to support
CSR programs. For governments, developing and administering a
local CSR audit program, toughening enforcement, and offering other
financial incentives all require significant financial resources and
discretion over available funds.28 1 For example, many participants in
277.
See also UN GLOBAL COMPACT & BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, supra note 43,
at 17-18 (observing that mandatory rules are particularly appropriate when the state
itself is a market actor).
278.
PARKER, supra note 33, at 245-91.
See UN GLOBAL COMPACT & BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, supra note 43, at 11.
279.
280.
See Lesley K. McAllister, Benjamin van Rooij & Robert A. Kagan,
Reorienting Regulation:Pollution Enforcement in IndustrializingCountries, 32 LAW &
POL'Y 1, 7-9 (2010) (observing that the "novel approaches to regulation, like traditional
regulatory approaches, ultimately depend on reliable monitoring data and other facets
of state enforcement to back them up"). Although not investigating state-backed CSR
specifically, recent empirical studies in weak regulatory environments confirm that
state enforcement is essential to the success of alternative regulatory strategies, such
as government-sponsored self-regulatory programs, voluntary guidelines, and marketbased incentives capacity, and other aspects of state enforcement to back them up. See,
e.g., van Rooij & Lo, supra note 223 (surveying voluntary regulation in China).
Subnational governments with developed CSR programs, such as Wenzhou,
281.
Wuxi, Yantai, and Pudong, all have dedicated discretionary funds available to offer
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local government audit programs are already CSR leaders or have
been selected as pilot participants by local government program
sponsors. 282 For these firms, offering financial incentives or
regulatory waivers reduces the resources governments can spend to
improve enforcement among noncompliant firms, while achieving
little marginal benefit. On the other hand, governments that offer
financial rewards to noncompliant firms who reach compliance
standards are using state resources to subsidize the cost of
compliance. Both strategies are difficult to expand broadly with
limited government resources. 283
At present, the "adaptive informal institutions" that ground
Chinese business culture sit uneasily with increasingly tough legal
rules and rising public expectations of business and of governments.
However, changing established business culture requires a
simultaneous transformation of bureaucratic culture. Neither is
certain and both are likely to proceed slowly, if at all. Although CSR
initiatives themselves may stimulate this change, many depend on
the innovation of individual officials who often serve in a single post
for only a few years. 284 There is also a risk that state-driven CSR
programs might push too fast, creating pressure for firms or
governments to show false progress on measures that are for the most
part likely to bear fruit primarily in the long term. 285 CSR-related
legislation also falls prey to the same deficiencies as existing
legislation in China, which is often vague, contradictory, and lacking
clear enforcement mechanisms. 286
Finally, the underlying challenge of legal implementation in
China is the negotiated nature of law itself. State-centric CSR
explicitly expands the potential scope of that negotiation but cannot
alter its underlying dynamics. As the work of Gunningham and
others suggest, whether state-centric CSR ultimately supports or
undermines law depends on the convergence of incentives for firms,
and in a state-centric model, for governments as well.

incentives to firms and cover administrative costs of CSR programs. van Rooij & Lo,
supra note 223; Interview with Gao Baoyu, supra note 142; Pudong CSR Interview,
supra note 203 (reporting that start-up costs for a CSR guideline and audit program
can cost local governments 2 to 3 million RMB).
282.
One of the challenges encountered by the Hangzhou program was the
discovery that the "leading" CSR performers were large firms who were already
exceeding compliance targets. Hangzhou CSR Interview, supra note 198.
283.
As one interviewee put it, "You can't really rely on cash [to incentivize CSR]
when there are more than 8,000 small- and medium-sized enterprises in Wenzhou."
Interview with Gao Baoyu, supra note 142.
284.
Interview with Governmental Affairs Liaison, Am. Chamber of Commerce,
in Shanghai, China (June 7, 2011).
285.
Many thanks to the CSR director of a major European multinational in
China for raising this issue. Interview with CSR Manager, supra note 246.
286.
For examples, see Lin, supra note 9, at 65.
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B. Communicative Impact and the Legitimacy of Law
Perhaps one of the most critical ways, then, in which statesponsored CSR influences the implementation of law is through its
inherent communicative effect. 287 Like formal regulation, statebacked CSR instruments signal the government's endorsement of
CSR practices, which can have a stronger indirect effect on the social
norms that undergird respect for law than the direct effects of the
regulation or policy itself. 288 However, prior empirical studies of
voluntary regulatory measures confirm that the legitimacy of CSR,
and by extension of the laws it rests on, depend on the consistency of
the message and the legitimacy of the state itself as a CSR
supporter. 289 Under a state-centric CSR model, the single most
important determinant of its success is therefore government
responsibility. 29 0
In this regard, China faces the same chicken and egg problem
that many European governments faced in the early 2000s when they
first adopted CSR public policies. At that time; many looked to statebacked CSR, somewhat paradoxically, as a way to bolster the
legitimacy of the state in the face of a perceived governance crisis in
which both governments and major firms played a role. 29 1 In the
Chinese context, corruption, unchecked local abuses of power, weak
government responses to corporate scandals, and state crackdowns on
public protest when violations of law are uncovered all undermine the
legitimacy of the state as an advocate of CSR. Although predictable
regulatory enforcement need not be a prerequisite to state-backed
CSR, a gap between the two sends firms inconsistent messages,
undermining compliance incentives.

287.
On the communicative effect of law and public policy, see Richard Pildes,
The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A Comment on the
Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936, 937 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024 (1996).
Pildes, supra note 287, at 937 (1991); Sunstein, supra note 287, at 2024.
288.
Prior studies suggest that market forces and voluntary measures can produce greater
respect for the norms underlying mandatory rules. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, The
Rhetoric of CorporateLaw: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on CorporateNorms, 31
J. CORP. L. 675, 698 (2006) (asserting that corporate rhetoric is important in shaping
corporate norms of behavior).
See Daniel Fiorino, Green Clubs: A New Tool for Government?, in
289.
VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS, supra note 61, at 209, 228 (observing that voluntary programs'
success depends critically on the underlying legitimacy of the state sponsor, the
reputation of program participants, and the state's ability to prevent shirking once
participants are admitted or acknowledged as CSR achievers).
The need to move toward concepts of responsible organizations, not just
290.
responsible business, has been recognized by many governments. See, e.g., ISO, supra
note 24, at 2.
See, e.g., Albareda et al., supra note 3, at 349 (explaining the origin of CSR
291.
policies in Britain as a crisis in governance); Moon, supra note 3, at 5-11 (analyzing
drivers of CSR in the United Kingdom).
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China's current CSR programs have a strong potential for
positive communicative effect, particularly in endorsing a broad
definition of CSR that reinforces legal compliance and extends across
firms' operations. Recent empirical studies of Chinese business
leaders and the broader public confirm that both tend to define CSR
as "ad hoc public philanthropy," "strategic philanthropy," and "ethical
business practices." 29 2 Public surveys also find widespread skepticism
of firms' true commitment to CSR.293 Some governments perpetuate
this narrow view by soliciting charitable contributions and rewarding
firms for philanthropy regardless of their business practices.
Nonetheless, all local-level CSR guidelines adopted by Chinese
governments at present prioritize basic legal compliance over
philanthropic contributions, and their comprehensive approach to
CSR is echoed in the regulatory measures that incorporate CSR. 294
However, some subnational CSR guidelines introduce what
David and Louise Trubek term a "rivalry" with formal law and
legislation that might actually undermine compliance. 295 For
instance, in some cases, the guidelines explicitly permit firms to
deviate from legal requirements as an incentive to participation in the
CSR guideline/audit program. For example, in recent years many
employers have paid social insurance fees for as few as one-third of
their employees, although legally, all employees must be covered.
Under the Wenzhou CSR audit guidelines, a passing rate is awarded

292.
Tang & Li, supra note 121, at 199; see also Wendy Chapple & Jeremy
Moon, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Asia: A Seven-Country Study of CSR
Web Site Reporting, 44 BUs. & SoC'Y 415, 418 (2005) (analyzing the content of firm
websites); Ans Kolk, Pan Hong & Willemijn van Dolen, CorporateSocial Responsibility
in China:An Analysis of Domestic and ForeignRetailers'SustainabilityDimensions, 19
Bus. STRATEGY & ENVT 289, 290-98 (2010) (same); Shangkun Xu & Rudai Yang,
Indigenous Characteristics of Chinese Corporate Social Responsibility Conceptual
Paradigm, 93 J. BUS. ETHICS 321, 326-27 (2010) (identifying common CSR definitions
as including "Social donation/charity" and "Economic responsibility").
293.
See, e.g., Chen Xudong, CSR in China: Consciousness and Challenges-A
Study Based on Zhejiang Province, Conference Paper Presented at the Conference on
U.S.-China Business Cooperation in the 21st Century: Opportunities and Challenges
for Entrepreneurs (Apr. 15-17, 2009) (on file with author) (finding a large gap between
enterprises and the public in perceived corporate CSR performance).
294.
See, e.g., SASAC CSR Notice, supra note 177,
17 (encouraging SOEs to
embed CSR within corporate governance, operations, and development strategy).
Although not necessarily representative of their jurisdictions, all officials interviewed
in Shanghai and Zhejiang in this study supported this view; interviewees in
Guangdong less consistently so. This broad view of CSR explicitly rejects the dominant
approach toward CSR common in many developing countries. See Visser, supra note
104, at 489 (proposing a new CSR pyramid for developing countries in which economic
responsibilities and philanthropy form the lower levels of the pyramid with legal
responsibilities and then ethical responsibilities at its peak).
295.
See Trubek & Trubek, supra note 7, at 543 (explaining that within a
co-regulatory mix, "rivalry" occurs when "new governance" forms work in opposition to
law).
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to companies who cover only 85 percent of the workforce. 296 In
Hangzhou, governments are considering easing the social insurance
requirement as a financial subsidy to reward top performers on the
CSR audits, even though 100 percent contribution is currently
required to attain a top "A" designation.2 97 By explicitly endorsing a
lower standard than the law requires, these governments' CSR
programs send mixed messages to participating firms, signaling that
CSR programs are in fact a situs for negotiated legal compliance.
C. The Limits of State-Centric CSR
Many questions remain about the ability and commitment of
both central and local governments to promote legal compliance and
advance CSR. What is clear is that CSR must be considered as part
and parcel of the legal environment for business and that law's
legitimacy will itself be either enhanced or undermined by firms'
responses to state-backed CSR. Although particular solutions to these
challenges are beyond the scope of this Article, the following are some
of the key issues that governments in China must take into account.
1. Government Awareness and Government Legal Compliance.
Because the state has constrained the space for public participation
and civil society leadership in CSR, receptivity of business leaders to
the concept will depend on raising government leaders' awareness of
CSR and its connection to existing law. A number of subnational
governments are working with international organizations to train
officials on CSR concepts and strategies. 298 However, the messages of
local and national leaders, and even different agencies working in the
CSR policy space within the same jurisdiction, are not always
aligned, 299 nor do they yet uniformly support legal compliance as a
foundation of CSR. CSR coordinating units that engage leaders of
multiple agencies might contribute to a more consistent message, as
will efforts to hold officials accountable for adherence to law within
their scope of responsibility. 30 0 Policymakers in China are currently

296.
Interview with Gao Baoyu, supra note 142. This is in contrast to the
standard practice of paying insurance for only 30 percent of the workforce. The
implementation of China's Social Insurance Law, which took effect in July 2011, may
alter this policy.
297.
Hangzhou CSR Interview, supra note 198.
298.
Interview with Daniel Taras, supra note 136 (discussing training programs
in Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces).
299.
OECD, supra note 124; Interview with Gao Baoyu, supra note 142.
300.
An indication of the scale of noncompliance within government is that
China's 2011 Action Plan for Intellectual Property Protection commits to ensure that
state agencies purchase only copyrighted software for official use. STATE INTELLECTUAL
PROP. OFFICE OF THE P.R.C., OFFICE OF THE INTER-MINISTERIAL JOINT MEETING FOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY, CHINA'S
ACTION PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 2011 1 27 (Apr. 25, 2011),

available at www.lawinfochina.com.
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considering addressing this issue by extending firm-focused CSR
guideline and audit programs to evaluate government performance in
select localities, 301 and opportunities are expanding for local
governments to share experiences in CSR policy implementation with
each other.
2.
Greenwashing and Negotiated Compliance. As developed
countries have found, state-sponsored CSR programs can be
perceived as government greenwashing or an opportunity for capture
by regulated firms. 302 Therefore, transparency and equal access to
incentives are key as CSR pilot programs mature to prevent statebacked incentives from becoming another space for negotiated
compliance; neither is yet a hallmark of the current Chinese business
environment.
3.
Borrowed Legitimacy and Risk Shifting. Local governments
that are promoting CSR are well aware of their own legitimacy deficit
and of the risk they face if government-endorsed CSR leaders turn
out to be the culprits in a compliance-related scandal. 303 Many
currently "borrow legitimacy" by contracting with third-party
auditors and international NGO partnerships to implement CSR
programs. Although contracting out can shift some of the risk of
failure to third parties, the legitimacy of the state as a legislator,
regulator, and enforcer will inevitably affect firms' perceptions of
these programs.
4.
Bottom-up Demand and Civic Engagement. Governments
across China are increasingly confronted by vocal grassroots
movements demanding a response to illegal or irresponsible business
practices. However, as Chinese scholars have also noted, state-centric
CSR weakens the potentially reinforcing and balancing role of
stakeholders and of market forces by limiting the space for
independent civil society and voluntary firm initiative. 304 Unless
governments are willing to broaden the space for other actors to
engage firms around CSR, prospects for state-backed CSR to serve as
a catalyst for basic legal compliance will remain limited.

301.
If adopted, these standards would potentially extend to all of China's
development zones (kaifaqu). Pudong CSR Interview, supra note 203. The MOFCOM
Sino-Dutch project is also developing an indicator tool in partnership with GRI to
assess firm and government CSR progress. See Indicator Evaluation System, CHINA
CORP. Soc. RESP. MONITORING & EVALUATION Sys., http://www.siccsr.org/en/
Column List.aspx?columnlD=32.
302.
The risk of capture has been noted in the CSR literature. See, e.g.,
McAllister et al., supra note 280, at 2.
303.
Coglianese and Nash note that this risk is endemic to all governmentsponsored voluntary programs. See Coglianese & Nash, supra note 61, at 30 (drawing
on club theory to explain the phenomenon).
304.
See Zhou Linbin & He Chaodan, Shilun "Chaoyue Falu" de Qiye Shehui
Zeren [Considering CSR "Beyond the Law'], in STUDIES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 130, at 103, 119.
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capture by powerful firms remains a concern, the opposite challenge
is that the state's dominance in the CSR space allows it to effectively
tax firms in the name of CSR, for example, by pressuring them to
contribute to state-backed development programs or maintain
unjustifiably high employment levels.3 05 These self-serving uses of
CSR policy undermine the business case for CSR and may even
impair some firms' survival. This suggests a need for governments to
reconsider the proper boundary between firm and state responsibility
and strictly limit the government's role in some aspects of CSR, such
as direct corporate philanthropy.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Recent efforts of China's central-level ministries, subnational
governments, and state-backed organizations to advance CSR
demonstrate how state sponsorship of CSR can complement economic
and legal development, particularly as emerging markets mature. To
be sure, governments in China have been motivated to promote CSR
by a complex mix of policy goals, as well as by the initiative of
individual officials and business leaders. Nonetheless, state
sponsorship of CSR is creating new incentives for firms to meet and
exceed minimum legal standards. State-centric CSR must therefore
be understood as part of the broader regulatory environment and as
part of a toolkit of cooperative strategies to reward compliance
leaders.
However, in contrast to governments that have followed a
market-led or relational approach, China's state-centric approach to
CSR does not signal any change in the underlying relationships
between the state, business, and civil society. Despite the
independent initiative of many firms, civil society organizations, and
individuals, much of the impetus toward CSR in China at present
depends, directly or indirectly, on the support of state agencies, Party
policy, and local government innovation. Far from a "regulatory
reconfiguration," 306 then, China's recent experience supports the
findings of prior comparative work that state backing for CSR is
largely a function of the local institutional context.
Because the state's influence in the Chinese context extends
beyond a regulatory, policymaking, or even intermediary role, state-

Such issues were raised repeatedly by interviewees in this study. See, e.g.,
305.
Zhejiang CSR Opinion 2008, supra note 181, at III ("[Governments should] avoid
adding unreasonable burdens to enterprises in the name of fulfilling social
responsibilities.").
Gunningham, supra note 62, at 126 (describing transitions in western
306.
economies toward a mix of nonstate law and complementary traditional regulation).
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centric CSR has great potential to influence corporate behavior when
government commitment and resources lend support. As a focus of
local innovation and intergovernmental learning, state-backed CSR
also has the potential to influence future regulatory reform at the
national level. 307 However, the preliminary evidence on the
institutions, goals, and incentives of state CSR programs presented
here suggests that they cannot replace traditional regulatory
enforcement, nor can they substitute for independent firm
commitment.
State-centric CSR is very much at an experimental stage. Key
questions remain about its intersection with civil society efforts to
promote greater corporate accountability. Future research might also
usefully explore its actual impact on firm compliance incentives. For
example, since only the successful participants in state-backed
voluntary programs are publicly disclosed, little is known about the
effects of CSR incentives on CSR laggards. Research is also needed to
investigate the extent of CSR policy diffusion and convergence among
subnational governments and understand the experience of
governments in less economically developed provinces. The potential
positive and negative effects of state relational ties on firm CSR
practice and legal compliance must also be examined. Ultimately, the
question of whether state promotion of CSR can drive new
understandings of corporate accountability in China as it has
elsewhere will depend on whether the state itself-at all levels-can
demonstrate its own commitment to the letter and spirit of the law.

307.
See generally Heilmann, supra note
innovation in national-level reform).

18 (analyzing the role of local
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APPENDIX

Table 1: Government CSR Roles and Instruments
CSR

PRC
Selected
Subnational
CSR Initiatives*

Examples/Instruments

PRC National
Initiatives

Endorsing/Raising

Identify and promote

Ministry of Civil Afairs

CSR awards &

Awareness

companies leading in

China Charity Awards

public

Shanghai Stock
Exchange & China
Securities Index Co., Ltd.
Social Responsibility
Index; Tianjin TED CO. &
Shenzhen Stock
Exchange TEDA
Environmental Index

announcement of
CSR leaders:
Zhejiang, Fujian,
Hebei and
Shandong
Provinces; Tianjin,
Chongqing,
Shanghai;
Changzhou, Wuxi,

Government Roles
SOFT

CSR; CSR awards
Promote CSR through
websites, publications,
and public surveys
Undertake public surveys
and communication
campaigns

SASAC/CASS China Top
100 CSR Research
Reports

Include CSR measures
within public
procurement
requirements and state
fiscal policy

MOFCOM Sino-Swedish,
Sino-Dutch CSR
information
dissemination projects

Advocate CSR as part of
international trade and
investment policy
Endorse fair-trade
labeling systems and
international CSR
initiatives, such as the
Global Compact and the
GRl
Facilitating

Guangdong
International CSR
Research Center
publications and
conferences
SASAC Centrally
Administered SOEs CSR
Committee (2010)

Offer CSR services and
support to CSR
initiatives by companies
or civil society partners

Shanghai Exchange
Notice on Strengthening
Listed Companies'
Assumption of Social
SocialoResponsibility (2008)
Index;g TiiEnterprise
Shenzhen Stock
Exchange CSR
Guidelines for Listed
Companies (2006)

Form institutions to
develop and implement
CSR policy
CSR "heat practices"
Develop CSR guidelines,
monitoring and audit
programs
assitnce

a traininge

CSR training
courses: Hebei,
Jiangsu, Liaoning,
Shandong,and
Zhejiang
Provinces
Shanxi Province
Industrial
CSR
Guide

CASS 2.0 & 3.0 CSR

Official CSR
policy/oversight
offices: Changha
(Hunan); Zhejiang;

MOFCMHangzhou,

Shandong;

Ningbo

(Zhejiang);
Shanghai Pudong;
Changzhou, Wuxi
(Jiangsu); Weihai
(Shandong);
Shenzhen

Offer incentives for
voluntary CSR reporting,
CSR performance, and
adoption of international
CSR standards
Capacity building
Promote standardization
of CSR management
models, standards,
reports, indicators and
auditing systems,
I________

Nanjing (Jiangsu);
Hangzhou, Ningbo
(Zhejiang); Weihai
(Shandong);
Shenzhen,
Guangzhou
(Guangdong),
among others

I

CSR audit and
guideline
programs:
Jiangsu;
Shanghai;
I(Shandong; Tianjin

2013]
Government Roles
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ExamplesiInstruments

PRC National
Initiatives
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Selected
PIC
Subnational
CSR Initiatives*
Binhai; Changsha
(Hunan); Yiwu,
Hangzhou,
Wenzhou,
Taizhou, Ningbo
(Zhejiang);
Changzhou, Wuxi,
Nanjing (Jiangsu);

including standards for
socially responsible
investment and product
labeling
Enact enabling
legislation to promote
socially responsible
investment,
environmental
standards, fair trade,Yuheng
sustainable consumption,
work-life balance, equal
opportunities, employee
volunteering, employee
conditions, and corporate
transparency

ying, Yantai

Grant
funding/technical
assistance for
technology
upgrades to meet
environmental
targets and/or
create compliance

Finance CSR research
and innovation programs

systems (widely
adopted)
Changzhou CSR
Standard
(CSA8000) (2004)

Partnering

Facilitate business
networks around CSR
Establish public-private
partnerships with
business and/or civil
society organizations

China-OECD Project on
Chinese and OECD
Government Approaches
to Encouraging
Responsible Business
Conduct
MOFCOM/ Sino-German
(GIZ) public-private
partnership program

Hebei Provincial
Government
Training Center of
Business & Trade
& Ludong
University CSR
Pilot & Promotion
Program (2005)
Hebei & Zhejiang
Province CSR
management
training under
MOFCOM SinoGerman CSR
Project (20082010)
Shandong
Province Assoc. for
Enterprise Credit
& CSR (SDACR)
research and audit
initiative

Guangdong
Poverty
Alleviation Day
Guangdong
Environmental
Responsibility
Alliance (2012)
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National

CSR

Selected

I

Mandating

_

Requiring mandatory
CSR reports or similar
disclosures
Include CSR within the
company law
Include CSR measures
within public
procurement
requirements and state
fiscal policy
Establishing minimum
compliance standards
and enforcement
mechanisms
Implement international
agreements and
guidelines through
national legislation and
binding standards
Standardize or require
CSR management
models, reports,
indicators, and auditing
systems, including
standards for socially
responsible investment
and product labeling

I

I

Code of Corporate
Governance for Listed
Companies (CSRC)
(2001)
CRBC (2007)
Recommendations on
Strengthening Large
Commercial Banks'
Social Responsibilities,
CSR reporting

PRC

Subnational

Initiatives

CSR Initiatives*

Mandatory CSR
Guideline and
Audit Program:
Weihai
(Shandong)
Shandong Quality
Inspection brand
evaluation system

MEP, CBRC, PBOC,
CSRC green finance,
green credit, and green
listing policies (2007)
Shanghai Stock
Exchange Guidelines on
Listed Companies'
Environmental
Information Disclosure
(2008)
Ministry of Finance,
CSRC, National Audit
Office, Basic Internal
Control Norms for
Enterprises (2008, 2011)

Mandate disclosures
regarding socially
responsible investment
Principal-Agent

Mandatory and voluntary
tools implemented
through board and
managerial control (see
above)

SASAC 2006 Enterprise
Risk Management
Guidelines for State
Enterprises (SOEs)
Under Central State
Control
SASAC Guidelines to
SOEs Directly Under the
Central Government on
Fulfilling Corporate
Social Responsibilities
(2008)

HARD

Framework adapted from: Fox, WARD & HOWARD, supra note 4; LOZANO ALBAREDA &
YSA, supra note 3, at 34-35, 46-49. Full references for all table content sources are on
file with the author.
*For more comprehensive information on subnational initiatives, see supra Tables 2.1.3, and accompanying text.

